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INTRODUCTION 
On January 26, 2009,1 Nadya Suleman delivered octuplets, setting off a media frenzy.  
                                                                 
© Copyright 2010. 
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1
Randal C. Archibald et al., Octuplets, 6 Siblings, And Many Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at A14, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/world/americas/04iht-04octuplets.19914715.html. 
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While initially greeted with amazement, public reaction quickly turned ugly, as details about the 
conception and Ms. Suleman, dubbed the “Octomom,” came to light.  She was an unemployed, 
single mother who used a worker’s compensation settlement to finance her in vitro fertilization 
(IVF).2  In a typical IVF cycle, the woman undergoes ovarian stimulation with fertility drugs, 
followed by an egg retrieval procedure.  Suitable eggs are then combined with sperm in the 
laboratory.  Eggs that successfully fertilize and develop into embryos of sufficient quality are 
eligible for transfer to the woman’s uterus.3  Suleman’s physician implanted twelve embryos, far 
more than recommended by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).4 To make 
matters worse, she already had six children, also conceived through IVF,5 three of whom were 
receiving public assistance for developmental disabilities.6 
Reaction to the news was swift.  The paparazzi swarmed, making Suleman an instant 
celebrity with her own reality-TV show.7  But the attention generated by Suleman and her 
octuplets did more than create another example of infotainment excess.  It prompted rapid 
legislative response,8 investigation by the state medical disciplinary board9 and by the ASRM10 
into the conduct of Suleman’s physician, the filing of a guardianship petition to monitor the 
octuplets’ finances,11 and widespread debate among academics12 and the public13 about the 
                                                                 
2
The Associated Press, California Medical Board Probes Octuplet Birth, Feb. 6, 2009, MSNBC.COM, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29057426/; Dateline NBC, Meet Nadya Suleman, Mother of Octuplets, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 
10, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/291129311). 
3
See generally AM. SOC’Y FOR REPRODUCTIVE MED., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHS.: A GUIDE FOR 
PATIENTS 4-9 (2008), available at http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/ 
Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/ART.pdf. 
4
It was widely reported at the time of the birth that Suleman’s physician, Dr. Michael Kamrava, had 
transferred six embryos, two of which split into twins.  Alan Duke, Medical Society Boots Doctor Who Did IVF, CNN.COM 
(Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/SHOWBIZ/10/19/octomom.doctor/index.html?iref=allsearch.    However, Dr. 
Kamrava admitted at his disciplinary hearing before the California Medical Board that he had transferred twelve embryos 
– all of the available fresh embryos from Suleman’s latest IVF cycle.   Molly Henessey-Fiske, Suleman Doctor Says He 
Was Wrong; He Shouldn’t Have Implanted a Dozen Embryos, the Fertility Specialist Testifies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, 
at LATExtra 1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/22/local/la-me-1022-octuplets-doctor-20101022. 
5
Id. 
6
Jessica Garrison & Garrett Therolf, Octuplets’ Mother Receives Public Assistance, L.A. NOW, Feb. 9, 
2009, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/02/nadya-suleman-w.htm. 
7
See Duke, supra note 4. 
8
See infra text accompanying notes 28-31 (discussing various legislative responses to the octuplet’s birth). 
9
After an extensive hearing, Administrative Law Judge Daniel Juarez found, inter alia, that Kamrava’s 
transfer of twelve embryos to Nadya Suleman, as well as an earlier transfer of eight embryos to her in an unsuccessful 
cycle, constituted gross negligence.  In the Matter of First Amended Accusation Against Michael Kamrava, Proposed 
Decision, Dec. 20, 2010, at 32, ¶ 13 [hereinafter Kamrava, Proposed Decision].  He recommended that Kamrava retain his 
medical license but be placed on five years probation, during which time he would be required to take an ethics course and 
practice under supervision.  Id. at 41-43.  The California Medical Board rejected Judge Juarez’ recommendation of 
probation and is undertaking a review of the case before issuing a final ruling on license revocation.  Molly Hennessy-
Fiske, Doctor Could Still Lose License, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at AA2. 
10
Press release, Am. Soc’y for Reproductive Med., ASRM Reacts to Latest News about California 
Octuplets, http://www.asrm.org/news/article.aspx?id=628&terms=(+%40Publish_To+Both+Sites+or+%40Publish_To+ 
ASRM+ Only+)+and+suleman (last accessed Apr. 24, 2010). 
11
The Associated Press, Court Rules in Favor of Octuplets’ Mother, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Jan. 10, 2010, at 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol14/iss2/3
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current use of assisted reproductive technology (ART) in our society.  In particular, the case 
brought to the fore concerns over the perceived unregulated nature of ART practice.14 
Calls for regulation of ART are nothing new.15  However, the reaction to Suleman was so 
vitriolic and inextricably related to her identity as a mother that it seemed appropriate to look 
more closely at the “post-Octomom” calls to action.  For these reasons, this article will focus on 
those areas of concern and potential regulation that have been raised by the Suleman case and, 
more specifically, legislative efforts to limit the number of embryos transferred in any IVF cycle.  
Part I begins by considering what exactly is so troubling about the Octomom and identifying 
specific responses to those concerns.  Part II hones in on one set of responses—proposed embryo 
transfer limits—and assesses their constitutionality, as constitutional law has served as an 
important bulwark against attacks on reproductive freedom.16  Part III considers whether, if such 
                                                                 
A4; Tracey Garcia, Octuplet Guardianship Proceedings Halted by State Appeals Court, WHITTIER DAILY NEWS, Aug. 7, 
2009, available at http://www.whittierdailynews.com/octuplets/ci_13017810. 
12
See Naomi Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight Is Enough, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 501 (2009); June Carbone, 
Who Decides What Number of Children is “Right?” 104 NW. U. L. REV. 109 (2009); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Why We 
Should Ignore The “Octomom”, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 120 (2009). 
13
Jessica Garrison et al., Octuplets’ Birth Spawns Outrage From Public, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/07/local/me-octuplets7. 
14
Stephanie Saul, Birth of Octuplets Puts Focus on Fertility Industry and Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/health/12ivf.html (“The issue has taken on renewed scrutiny since  
. . . Nadya Suleman  . . . gave birth to octuplets near here last month . . . .  [U]nlike some other countries, the United States 
has no laws to enforce those guidelines.”); see Cahn & Collins, supra note 12, at 503; see Carbone, supra note 12. 
 Concern that ART lacks sufficient regulation predates the Suleman case.  See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Equal 
Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457 (2008) (stating that 
“Regulating reproductive technologies . . . is a theoretical issue right now because there is virtually no such regulation in 
the United States” and describing “the regulatory vacuum surrounding [ART]”); Jennifer Rosato, The Children, Birth of 
ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect Them from Harm, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 57, 62 (2004) 
(noting “very little oversight or regulation” of ART); Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to 
In Vitro Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2794-95 (2005) [hereinafter Note] (describing regulation as limited). 
 However, the perception of ART as the “wild, wild West” of medicine may not match the reality.  The 
American Society of Reproductive Technology has issued a report asserting that ART is “already one of the most highly 
regulated of all medical practices in the United States.”  Oversight of Assisted Reproductive Tech., 12 ASRM BULLETINS, 
no. 18, May 25, 2010.  See also G. David Adamson, Does Self-Regulation Work for Implementation of Single Embryo 
Transfer, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 256 (Jan Gerris et al. eds., 2009) (describing ART in the U.S. as “very highly 
regulated,” despite the perception of a lack of regulation). 
15
George J. Annas, The Shadowlands-Secrets, Lies, and Assisted Reproduction, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
935, 937 (1998); Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 637-657 (1997); Lars 
Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 
648-59 (2003).  See Rosato, supra note 14, at 57. 
16
While constitutional law has protected women’s right to abortion since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), even during the most expansive period for substantive due process, the Supreme Court did not guarantee that 
everyone would have access to abortion through public funding.  See Harris v. McRae 448 U.S. 297 (1980).  For that 
reason (and others), feminists have questioned whether the emphasis on securing “rights,” as opposed to access, was the 
appropriate focus for advocates.  See Sandra Berenknopf, Judicial and Congressional Back-Door Methods That Limit the 
Effect of Roe v. Wade: There is No Choice If There Is No Access, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 653, 698 (1997) (“By using back-door 
methods such as withholding Medicaid funding . . . Congress and the courts have consistently limited the force of Roe v. 
Wade in the lives of poor women . . . . [I]f a woman does not have access to abortion, then she cannot choose to have an 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
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limits are constitutional, they can be justified as a matter of policy, and argues that these efforts 
need to be understood in the larger context of the ongoing assault on women’s reproductive rights 
and the sexist treatment of women as patients and mothers.  While we might think that regulation 
of ART is a gender-neutral construct, efforts to regulate ART in the wake of the Octomom case 
have been anything but neutral and reveal much about how society and the law treats women and 
mothers in particular.  Finally, Part IV suggests that the existing system, which relies on physician 
self-regulation, the physician’s duty to obtain informed consent, and patient and physician 
education, while not a perfect solution, remains the preferred approach given existing political 
and cultural circumstances. 
I.  WHY IS EVERYONE SO MAD ABOUT THE OCTOMOM AND WHAT CAN WE DO 
ABOUT IT? 
A.  No Husband, No Job, No Sense 
The firestorm of criticism directed at Suleman centered on several aspects of her 
situation: the risk of harm to the children from such a high-order multiple birth;17 her seeming 
inability to support the children;18 and her questionable mental state.19  At the most basic level, 
                                                                 
abortion.”); April L. Cherry, Choosing Substantive Justice: A Discussion of “Choice,” “Rights,” and the New 
Reproductive Technologies, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 431, 433 (1997) (“For example, most feminists have supported 
abortion in the terms of choice and bodily integrity, viewing any restriction regarding pre-viability access to abortion as 
working against the goal of equality for women.”); Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother: Why America’s 
Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse is Not the Answer – A Comparative Legal Analysis 15 MICH. J. GENDER & 
L. 389, 456-457 (2009) (discussing the fragility of the constitutional right to abortion and abortion opponents’ “multiple 
avenues to undercut women’s ability to control” reproductive rights and access to abortion); Courtney Miller, Reflections 
on Protecting Conscience for Health Care Providers: A Call For More Inclusive Statutory Protection in Light of 
Constitutional Considerations, 15 S.CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 327, 340 (2006) (discussing the conscience clause 
movement in reaction to abortions rights groups’ drive to make abortion access a Constitutional right rather than being 
merely permitted); Ronli Sifris, Restrictive Regulation of Abortion and the Right to Health 18 MED. L. REV. 185, 211-212 
(2010) (arguing that restrictions on abortion violate the right to reproductive health; recognizing the connection between 
the right to health and the need for access to abortion.).  Likewise, while much of the scholarship and advocacy around 
ART involves rights of those using the technology, the barriers to access to the technology present a pressing concern as 
well.  See Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies:  Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 18 (2008); 
17
Saul, supra note 14, at A1; Andrews Health Law Litigation Rep., California Medical Board Accuses 
‘Octomom’ Doctor of Negligence, 17 No. 9 ANDREWS HEALTH L. LITIG. REP.  no. 9, Jan. 7, 2010, at 3; Alissa Stockage, 
Regulating Multiple Birth Pregnancies: Comparing the United Kingdom’s Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme with the 
United State’s Progressive, Intimate Decision-Making Approach, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 559, 563-567 (2010). 
18
NBC Today Show Profile: Latest Controversies with Octuplet Mom Nadya Suleman (NBC Television 
Broadcast Feb. 9, 2009); Sabrina Ghebremedin & Kimberly Brown, ABC Nightline News: Octuplet Mom Nadya Suleman 
Says She’s Struggling but Kids are Healthy, ABCNEWS.COM (July 13, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/octomom-
octuplets-mother/story?id=11152828); TMZ Staff, Octomom Gets Reprieve From Foreclosure! TMZ ONLINE, Mar. 24, 
2010, http://www.tmz.com/2010/03/24/octomom-nadya-suleman-foreclosure-house-la-habra-mortgage-kids/. 
19
CNN: Showbiz Tonight, (CNN television broadcast Feb. 25, 2009), transcript available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0902/25/sbt.01.html; Raina Kelly, Octomom Hypocrisy: Four Reasons Nadya 
Suleman Drives Us Crazy, and Why We’re Wrong, NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE, Mar. 3, 2009, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/03/02/octomom-hypocrisy.html; Kimi Yoshino, Jessica Garrison & Andrew Blankstein 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol14/iss2/3
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many believe Suleman simply had way too many children.  This criticism embodies two distinct 
concerns: (1) she had too many children at one time, putting the children at great risk for health 
problems and disabilities;20 and (2) she had too many children in total.  Common sense counseled 
that Suleman could not possibly care for that many children adequately, especially because she is 
single.  Typical comments included the following: 
It seems Nadya Suleman failed to take the elementary precaution of having a 
father around for her octuplets.  Or any income to raise them.  As if that wasn’t 
irresponsible enough, the 33-year old already has six other children under the 
age of seven, including two year old twins, courtesy of IVF and a sperm donor.  
Sorry honey, that isn’t a family: it’s a train crash.21 
To make matters worse, Suleman was unemployed and seemed unlikely to ever have the 
ability to provide adequately for her fourteen children.22  Even Suleman’s mother openly 
questioned her ability to support her children.23  In fact Suleman’s main source of income after the 
octuplets’ birth came from a reality TV show, which some view as exploiting the children.24  
Indeed, concern about her ability to support her children prompted a trial judge to appoint a 
guardian to oversee their finances,  although a California appellate court subsequently overturned 
the appointment.25  Critics feared that for all of these reasons, the burden of caring for the 
octuplets would fall on the state.  To make matters worse, Suleman seemed mentally unstable, not 
just to the public spectators, but to her own family.  Her mother revealed that Suleman kept the 
octuplet pregnancy a secret from her family by stating she had a tumor26 and her father admitted 
that he “question[ed] her mental situation.”27 
                                                                 
The Craze over Octomom Nadya Suleman, It’s All Just So Octo-licious, Nadya Suleman Can’t Seem to Get Enough Kids, 
and Media Audiences Can’t Seem to Get Enough of Her, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at 3. 
20
Saul, supra note 14, at A1. 
21
Allison Pearson, A miserable ‘miracle’, DAILY MAIL (last updated Feb. 17, 2009), at 15, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1135370/ALLISON-PEARSON-The-day-nostalgia-fell-skies.html. 
22
Latest Controversies with Octuplet Mom Nadya Suleman, supra note 18; Shaya Tayefe Mohajer, Octuplet 
Mom Nadya Suleman On Food Stamps, Three Kids Receive Disability, HUFFINGTON POST (11:27 PM; Feb. 9, 2009), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/10/octuplet-mom-nadya-sulema_n_165508.html). 
23
Latest Controversies with Octuplet Mom Nadya Suleman, supra note 18 (quoting Angela Suleman as 
asking: “How are you going to provide for them?  What are you thinking”); Katherine Thomson, Does Nadya Suleman 
Think She’s Angelina Jolie?, HUFFINGTON POST (12:12 PM; Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherine-
thomson/does-nadya-suleman-think_b_165617.html. 
24
NBC Today Show Profile: Guardian Appointed to Oversee Finances of Nadya Suleman’s Children, NBC 
Broadcast (July 28, 2009); Johnny Dodd, Octuplets Mom Inks TV Deal and Has Book in the Works, PEOPLE MAGAZINE 
ONLINE (May 31, 2009), http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20282320,00.html. 
25
Suleman v. Super. Ct., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Court Rules in Favor of Octuplets’ 
Mother, supra note 11; Garcia, supra note 11. 
26
Showbiz Tonight: Octu-mom’s Publicity Tour; Shocking Revelation from the Octu- Grandma; Inside the 
Obama White House; Hottest Hollywood Men Over 40 (CNN television broadcast Feb. 25, 2009), transcript available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0902/25/sbt.01.html. 
27
Sarah Westcott, Octuplets Mum ‘Absolutely Irresponsible’ Says Her Dad, DAILY EXPRESS, Feb. 21, 
2009, http://express.co.uk/posts/view/85752/Octuplets-mum-absolutely-irresponsible-says-her-dad. 
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B.  Legislatures Respond 
In the wake of the octuplets’ birth, a number of legislators across the country introduced 
legislation designed to prevent a similar ART debacle.  These bills fell roughly into two 
categories.  Some contained resolutions calling for study of the possibility of state regulation or of 
guidelines to be promulgated by medical professional societies.28  Other bills went further, 
imposing specific limits on the number of embryos that could be transferred in a given IVF cycle.  
Missouri H.B. 810 prohibited physicians from implanting more embryos than recommended by 
ASRM. 29  Senate Bill 169, introduced in the Georgia legislature, provided specific proscriptions 
regarding the permissible number of embryos for transfer: Women under age 40 could receive no 
more than two embryos; women older than 40 were limited to 3 embryos, and women using 
donated eggs or embryos were limited to two, regardless of the woman’s age.30 
Ultimately, none of the bills introduced in the wake of the octuplets’ birth became law.31  
Nonetheless, proposals to limit the number of embryos transferred through legislation continue to 
receive support in the literature32 and the popular press,33 are already the norm in other 
countries,34 and we likely have not seen the last of them here. 
The other areas of concern—Suleman’s utilization of ART when she already had six 
                                                                 
28
H. Res. 107, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); H. Con. Res. 130, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); 
Leg. Res. 236, 101st Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2009). 
29
H. B. 810, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009). 
30
S. B. 169, Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2009).  The provision in question (Provision 19-7-67) was included in the 
bill as first introduced.  See http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/versions/sb169_As_introduced_LC_37_0857_2.htm. 
31
H. Res. 107, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009) Measure History available at http://www.capitol. 
hawaii.gov/session2009/lists/measure_indiv.aspx?billtype=HR&billnumber=107 (last visited July 17, 2010) (showing that 
the bill was referred to committee in April of 2009 and nothing has happened to the bill since); H. Con. Res. 130, 25th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009) Measure History, available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov 
/session2009/lists/measure_indiv.aspx?billtype=HR&billnumber=130 (accessed July 17, 2010) (showing that the bill was 
referred to WLO in March of 2009 and nothing has happened to the bill since); H. B. 810, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2009) Bill Summary, available at http://www.house.mo.gov/content.aspx?info=/bills091/bills/hb810.htm 
(accessed July 17, 2010) (showing that no hearings are scheduled and the bill is currently on a calendar i.e. it is effectively 
dead); Legis. Res. 236, 101st Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2009) History, available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov 
/bills/view_bill.php?DocumentID=9135 (accessed July 17, 2010) (showing that the bill was referred to Judiciary 
Committee on May 21, 2009 and nothing has happened to the bill since); S. B. 169, Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2009) Status 
History available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2009_10/sum/sb169.htm (accessed July 17, 2010) (showing that the 
bill was sent to House Second Readers in March of 2009 and nothing has happened to the bill since). 
32
NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE BABIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS REGULATION 196 (2009); 
Rosato, supra note 14, at 85; Siddharth Khanijou, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction in Assisted Reproductive Technologies: 
A License To Kill? 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 403, 423 (2005); Urska Velikonja, Comment, The Costs of Multiple 
Gestation Pregnancies in Assisted Reproduction, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 463 (2009). 
33
See, e.g., LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE 333 (2007) (arguing for federal limits on number of 
embryos transferred) [hereinafter Mundy, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE]. 
34
Jan Gerris & Petra De Sutter, Single Embryo Transfer: Concepts and Definitions, in SINGLE EMBRYO 
TRANSFER 58 (Jan Gerris et al. eds.,  2009) (describing Belgian restrictions based on age, regardless of funding method); 
Stephanie N. Sivinski, Putting Too Many (Fertilized) Eggs In One Basket: Methods of Reducing Multifetal Pregnancies in 
the United States, 88 TEX. L. REV. 897, 906-07 (2010) (describing, inter alia, Great Britain’s Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) which has capped the number of embryos at two and Sweden’s legislation to make the 
transfer of a single embryo the norm for almost all IVF procedures). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol14/iss2/3
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children, especially in light of her marital and employment status and her mental state—did not 
provoke legislation but certainly contributed to the public outcry.35  Some suggested that 
physicians, if not the state, should refuse treatment to women who already have children (or at 
least an excessive number of children).36  For example, California State Senator Am Aanestad, a 
Republican, spoke out against establishing governmental standards for medical care—unless 
“taxpayer dollars” were spent for care of the children—”not just the eight now, but the previous 
six, over the course of their lifetime.”37  Others called for mandatory psychological screening of 
prospective patients..38  In fact, the California Medical Board cited Dr. Kamrava’s failure to refer 
Suleman for a mental health evaluation and to consider potential harm to her living children and 
any future offspring as evidence of gross negligence.39  Recently introduced legislation also seems 
to be opening the door to mandatory mental health screening when assisted reproductive 
technology agencies are involved.40 
I have serious concerns about whether any of these restrictions are permissible or 
advisable.  However, this Article will focus on the proposed limits on the number of embryos 
transferred, though the concerns that have animated the other two—what we might call 
irresponsible procreation or questionable parenting—will inform our understanding of the motives 
driving the first set of proposals.  I turn now to an analysis of the constitutional implications of 
embryo transfer limits. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
A.  Fundamental Rights At Stake 
Restrictions on access to and the practice of ART arguably raise due process 
constitutional concerns.  Cases involving procreation, parenting, and medical care all potentially 
                                                                 
35
Jessica Garrison et al., Octuplets’ Birth Spawns Outrage From Public, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/07/local/me-octuplets7. 
36
Tracee Cornforth, “Octo-Mom’s Fertiliyt Doctor Implants at Least 7 Embryos in 49-Year-Old Woman,” 
ABOUT.COM (Feb. 13, 2009), http://womenshealth.about.com/b/2009/02/13/octo-moms-fertility-doctor-implants-at-least-
7-embryos-in-49-year-old-woman.htm. 
37
Alison Stateman, The Octuplets Mom Speaks, and the Questions Grow, TIME.COM, Feb. 7, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1877962,00.html.  See also H.Con. Res. No. 107, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Haw. 2009) (specifically addressing concerns generated by Suleman; “Whereas, there has been public outcry and concern 
over the ethics of implanting numerous embryos in patients that may not have the resources to care for the children that 
result from the fertility treatment.”). 
38
S. B. 509, 3d Leg., 2010 Sess. (Kan. 2009) (requiring reporting of information regarding fertility 
treatment to the state, including “the method of psychological screening used to evaluate prospective patients and 
donors.”). 
39
Kim Yoshino, California Board Accuses Octuplets Doctor of Negligence, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-octuplets5-2010jan05,0,97780.story.  In a separate complaint, the California 
Medical Board cited Dr. Kamrava for failing to refer another patient with a quadruplet pregnancy or her husband or adult 
children for a “mental health evaluation to determine her willingness to undergo multi-fetal reduction.”  Tony Barboza, 
Medical Board Targets Doctor, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at AA1.  However, the Administrative Law Judge hearing the 
disciplinary charges against Kamrava found that failure to refer Suleman and the other patient for mental health evaluation 
did not constitute negliglence.  Kamrava, Proposed Decision, supra note 9, at 33, ¶ ¶18-19, 35, ¶ ¶34-35. 
40
S. B. 2240, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).  The bill died in committee on judiciary on Apr. 30, 2010. 
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impact the assessment of the constitutionality of embryo transfer limits.  I will address each in 
turn. 
1. The Right to Procreate 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the right to procreate as fundamental.  But what 
does it mean to identify a “right to procreate”?  In fact, Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area 
has two facets: the Constitution limits the state’s ability to hinder procreation and its ability to 
compel procreation.  These dual aspects of the right to procreate find expression in the first 
instance in the sterilization cases and in the second in the abortion and contraception cases.  The 
sterilization cases seem most analogous to restrictions on ART, so I begin there. 
Any discussion of the constitutionality of sterilization in the United States of course 
starts with Buck v. Bell, the case in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously declared 
“three generations of imbeciles are enough.”41  Carrie Buck, like her mother, was institutionalized 
in a Virginia mental hospital ostensibly because of feeble-mindedness.42  Consequently, the 
hospital sought to sterilize her under a Virginia statute allowing for sterilization of individuals 
suffering from inheritable conditions.  The Court upheld the statute, and the sterilization of Carrie 
Buck, on an open eugenics rationale, reasoning that “[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of 
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, 
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”43 
Fifteen years later, the Court had another occasion to consider the states’ ability to 
sterilize an individual without his or her consent in Skinner v. Oklahoma.44  In Skinner, the Court 
struck down an Oklahoma statute that provided for sterilization of habitual criminals.  In doing so, 
the Court recognized that procreation is “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race.”45  However, the Court decided the case on equal protection grounds and refrained from 
explicitly overruling Buck.  Indeed, although many have decried the Buck Court’s sanction of 
eugenics as a desirable rationale for sterilization,46 and although the Skinner Court acknowledged 
the danger of discriminatory policies and genocide, some commentators have suggested that the 
Supreme Court today would likely reaffirm the central principle of Buck—that the state can 
prohibit individuals from procreating—at least in certain ways.47  In fact, laws permitting 
                                                                 
41
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
42
Id. at 205. 
43
Id. at 207. 
44
316 U.S. 535, 536-37 (1942). 
45
Id. at 541. 
46
PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES 277-78 (2008); Michelle Oberman, Thirteen 
Ways of Looking at Buck v. Bell: Thoughts Occasioned by Paul Lombardo’s Three Generations, No Imbeciles 59 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 357, 361-65 (2010). 
47
See MICHELLE N. MEYER, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOV., STATES’ REGULATION OF 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES:  WHAT DOES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ALLOW? (July 2009), available at 
http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2009-07-States_Regulation_ART.pdf; Lombardo, supra note 46, at 271; Erika T. 
Blum, When Terminating Parental Rights is Not Enough: A New Look At Compulsory Sterilization 28 GA. L. REV. 977, 
999-1004 (1994); In re Conservatorship of Angela D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (1999) (upholding conservators’ rights to 
sterilize a mentally handicapped conservatee, noting the danger of rape and questionable ability to consent in mentally 
handicapped); CAL. PROB. CODE. § 1959 (describing the vulnerability of developmentally disabled persons to unlawful 
sexual conduct). 
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sterilization without the subjects’ consent currently continue to operate, though on a substantially 
smaller scale and different basis then in the heyday of eugenics.48 
Hence, it is clear that the right to procreate derived from the sterilization cases has never 
been absolute.  Moreover, the question remains whether the right to procreate encompasses the 
right to procreate by means of assisted reproduction.  Scholars have vigorously debated the 
point.49  Some would argue that we cannot equate the right to be free from forced sterilization 
with the right to access reproductive technology.50  They would posit that coerced sterilization 
involves a physical invasion of the person that poses risks to the person’s health and requires 
affirmative acts that take away a capability the person already has.51  Limiting access to ART, by 
contrast, implicates neither of these concerns.  The government would not be forcing any physical 
intrusion, and the restriction would arguably not constitute an act, since it would not disturb the 
procreative status quo of the individual.  Under this view, the right to procreate rests on a right of 
privacy grounded in the protection of bodily integrity, and thus would not extend to ART.52 
However, to accept this argument is to ignore Skinner’s recognition of the right to 
procreate as fundamental.  Numerous cases have since cited it for that proposition.53  Surely the 
Court’s frequent acknowledgment of a “right to procreate” means more than a right to be free 
from unwanted medical procedures or treatment or to be left alone to one’s own ability to 
procreate.  Nor should it turn on a false act/omission dichotomy.54  Indeed our understanding of 
the nature of the right to procreate needs to adjust to the changed circumstances of procreation in 
the 21st century.  The reconceptualization of the fundamental right to marry to encompass same-
sex marriage provides an instructive example of this process.  For example, in interpreting its 
state constitutional privacy provision, the California Supreme Court viewed the fundamental right 
to marry not in structural terms, that is, as protection for a defined entity of a man and a woman 
with a singular purpose of procreation.  Rather, it viewed the right in terms of the values 
underlying it—the significance of marriage to the happiness and fulfillment of the individuals 
involved. 55  Thus the right to marry deserved special protection because of its integral role in 
                                                                 
48
Lombardo, supra note 46, at 267-68; See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5701; Cf. Wirsing v. Mich. 
Protection and Advocacy Serv. (In re Wirsing), 573 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Mich. 1998) (allowing sterilization of incompetent 
woman on evidence of her best interests, but declining to apply a “clear and convincing evidence” standard); Estate of 
C.W., 640 A.2d 427, 428 (Pa.Super.1994) (applying a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for evaluating whether 
sterilization was in the patient’s best interest). 
49
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439 (2003); Rao, 
supra note 14, at 1459-67 (2008); Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzalez v. Carhart and Other Theories of 
Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514, 1517-19 (2008) 
[hereinafter Suter, Repugnance]; Rosato, supra note 14, at 95-98. 
50
Rao, supra note 14, at 1461. 
51
Id. at 1465. 
52
Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1518; Rosato, supra note 14, at 96. 
53
See e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720 (1997); Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 
760, 772 (Cal. 1985); Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1402 (Mo. 1990); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992); Thornburgh v. Amer. College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 773 (1986); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 34 (1973); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
54
See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 34 (1988) 
(critiquing notion of legally relevant distinctions between acts and omissions). 
55
See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 425 (Cal. 2008) (quoting Bruce C. Hafen, The 
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personal autonomy and liberty of the individual.  Likewise, we could deepen our understanding of 
the right to procreate consistent with the possibilities assisted reproductive technology now offers 
us.  If so, we can more easily make the case that the right to procreate is broad enough to 
encompass the right to access reproductive technology necessary to enable the infertile to 
procreate.56 
A look at the flip side of the right to procreate—the right not to procreate can provide 
support for this point.  Consider the contraception cases.  In Griswold v. Connecticut, the 
Supreme Court struck down a law prohibiting the use of contraception, finding that the law 
infringed the married couple’s right of privacy under the due process clause.57  A few years later, 
the Court considered another challenge to a contraceptive ban in Eisenstadt v. Baird.58  In 
Eisenstadt, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law banning the sale of contraceptives to 
unmarried persons. 59  In doing so, the Court made clear that the right of privacy encompassed the 
right of individuals, not just married couples, “to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget 
a child (emphasis added).”60 
The contraception cases thus advance the case for constitutional protection of ART in 
three ways.  First, Eisenstadt establishes that the constitutional right to privacy protects the 
decision whether to procreate; the right does not merely protect against unwarranted physical 
intrusions on one’s person, as we might have extrapolated from the sterilization cases.61  Second, 
the right applies to individuals, regardless of marital status.  Third, and quite significantly, the 
right protects access to the means of achieving the desired result—avoiding procreation through 
                                                                 
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. 
L. REV. 463, 482 (1983)) (“In light of the fundamental nature of the substantive rights embodied in the right to marry – 
and their central importance to an individual’s opportunity to live a happy, meaningful, and satisfying life as a full member 
of society . . . .”). 
56
There are additional layers of complexity to this issue that are not raised by proposed restrictions on 
embryo transfers.  Some would argue that use of certain technologies does not fall within the rubric of procreation.  For 
example, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) enables individuals to control the characteristics of their children, an 
opportunity not enjoyed by individuals who procreate naturally, so that procedure might not justify constitutional 
protection based on the right to procreate. Meyer, supra note 47, at 9-10.  For a fuller analysis of this argument, see 
Robertson, supra note 49.  IVF and embryo transfer, by contrast, truly operate as substitutes for procreation by natural 
means; instead of joining egg and sperm coitally, egg and sperm are joined in the lab and resulting embryos transferred to 
the uterus.  Of course, some might claim that the right to procreate means solely the right to genetically reproduce, which 
would take IVF using donor gametes outside the ambit of the right to procreate.  Others might respond that the right to 
procreate should encompass the right to assume parental status through creation of a child.  The embryo transfer limits 
discussed here, though, would apply to all users.  Moreover, although Nadya Suleman used sperm from a known donor, 
she could have inseminated herself or engaged in coital reproduction if she did not suffer from infertility.  Hence, we need 
not determine here if all assisted reproduction falls within the category of procreation to assess the constitutionality of 
embryo transfer restrictions. 
57
381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
58
405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
59
Id. at 454-55. 
60
Id. at 453.  See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 686-88 (1977) (discussing the 
privacy rights established in Eisenstadt regarding contraceptives). 
61
But see Suter, Repugnance supra note 49, at 1544-45 (positing that contraception cases protect bodily 
integrity by allowing individuals to prevent unwanted physical burdens). 
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technology, however rudimentary; the right does not simply prohibit the government from taking 
away some freedom or capability the person already possesses.  I would argue that the right of 
individuals to access ART for the purposes of procreating is no different than the right of 
individuals to access a condom, diaphragm, or other method of birth control for the purpose of 
avoiding procreation. 
A federal district court agreed with the analogy.  In Lifchez v. Hartigan,62 the court 
considered a challenge to an abortion statute that contained a provision prohibiting 
experimentation on a fetus.  The court ruled that the provision violated a woman’s fundamental 
right of privacy because it could be interpreted to prohibit procedures related to the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child, such as embryo transfer and chorionic villi sampling.  In the 
court’s view, these procedures fell squarely within the woman’s zone of privacy: 
Embryo transfer is a procedure designed to enable an infertile woman to bear 
her own child. It takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of 
constitutionally protected choices that includes the right to have access to 
contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right to submit to a 
medical procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy.63 
Moreover, in the ART context, a federal district court has held that the constitutional 
right to privacy encompasses a woman’s right to become pregnant by artificial insemination.64  
Considering the Supreme Court cases “holistically,” the court concluded that, “A woman has a 
constitutional privacy right to control her reproductive functions.” 65 
The notion that the fundamental right to privacy encompasses reproductive choice has 
been recognized in both Supreme Court and lower court opinions outside of the contraception and 
ART contexts as well.  In upholding a woman’s right to abortion, the Court in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, wrote that: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education. . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices 
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these 
                                                                 
62
735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
63
See also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 728 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (deciding whether to have children establishes “right of access”); J.R. v. 
Utah, 261 F. Supp.2d 1268, 1279 (D. Utah 2002) (observing that statute at issue did not prohibit gestational surrogacy or 
deny access to that medical technology, so plaintiffs had “effectively exercised their right to procreate,” though statute did 
unduly burden that right by declaring surrogate legal parent).  But see Robertson, supra note 49, at 454 (expressing doubt 
that conservative Supreme Court would find “most specific uses of assisted reproduction . . . constitutionally protected” 
but predicting that Court would grant protection to some technologies).  Cf. Abigail Alliance, 495 F. 3d at 711 n.19 
(distinguishing “protecting individual freedom from life-saving, but forced, medical treatment” from “providing 
affirmative access to a potentially harmful, and even fatal, commercial good”). 
64
Cameron v. Bd. of Educ., 795 F. Supp. 228, 236-37 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
65
Id. at 237. 
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matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.66 
Casey thus reaffirms the vitality of the Griswold protection of decision-making liberty, 
as well as the liberty interest in autonomy and bodily integrity that protects individuals from 
government coerced medical treatment recognized in cases like Cruzan.67  Casey thus supports 
the claim that ART and IVF, in particular, fall within the fundamental right to procreate. 
2. Familial Privacy and Parental Rights 
Embryo transfer restrictions also could run afoul of the constitutional protection afforded 
to decision-making about important family matters.  Beyond any concerns about infringing 
women’s right to procreate, legislative limits on the number of embryos transferred undercuts 
women’s parental authority.  The right to control the upbringing of one’s children is a 
constitutional right enjoyed by parents.68  Recognition of this right by the Supreme Court in fact 
predates the procreation cases.69  While the Supreme Court cases that have addressed the 
fundamental rights of parents have focused on education, custody, and visitation,70 in Parham v. 
J.R., the Court addressed a procedural due process challenge to procedures for commitment of 
minors.71  The Court stated that “our precedents permit the parents to retain a substantial, if not 
the dominant, role in the decision [to voluntarily commit a minor for psychiatric treatment], 
absent a finding of neglect or abuse.”72  Likewise, other cases have recognized a constitutional 
right for parents to make decisions regarding medical care for their children.73 
Embryo transfer limits and ART restrictions do not directly implicate the constitutional 
right to parent, however, because the woman undergoing IVF is making a decision about her own 
medical care, not the child’s.  At the time of the decision, there is no child, there are only potential 
children.  Moreover, defining it as a parental right runs the risk of elevating the status of the 
embryos to that of children.74  Thus, the constitutional right to parent does not present the 
                                                                 
66
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851. 
67
Id. at 2810. 
68
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
69
Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he interest 
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children – is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court.”) 
70
Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (education); Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (education); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972) (custody); Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (visitation).  Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (voluntary psychiatric 
commitment). 
71
Parham, 442 U.S. at 604. 
72
Id.  The Court earlier stated that parents generally the right and a “high duty” to seek medical care for 
their children.  Id. at 602. 
73
See, e.g., Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The right to family association 
includes the right of parents to make important medical decisions for their children, and of children to have those decisions 
made by their parents rather than the state.”); Matter of Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013-14 (1979). 
74
On the danger of according fetuses legal rights, see Lisa McLennan Brown, Feminist Theory and the 
Erosion of Women’s Reproductive Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and In Vitro Fertilization, 13 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87 (2005); Joyce E. McConnell, Relational and Liberal Feminism: the ‘Ethic of Care,’ 
Fetal Personhood and Autonomy, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 291 (1996).  This concern might be ameliorated by viewing the right 
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strongest basis for challenging embryo transfer limits.  I will argue, though, that the law’s 
treatment of parental decision-making provides a useful frame of reference for evaluating the 
wisdom of the policy at issue here.75 
3. The Right to Autonomy in Medical Decision-Making 
In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, the Supreme Court acknowledged a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, and assumed 
that this right encompassed refusal of life-saving nutrition and hydration. 76 Cruzan could have 
stood for broader recognition of a fundamental right to make decisions regarding one’s health 
care, but a subsequent decision related to medical care in the right-to-die context rejected that 
interpretation. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington law that 
criminalized assisted suicide. 77  The Court insisted on a “careful description” of the asserted 
fundamental right—to avoid expanding the category of fundamental rights—and thus found that 
there was no such right to assisted suicide.78  The Court wrote, “That many of the rights and 
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the 
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so 
protected.79 
If we apply Glucksberg’s “careful description” methodology to the embryo transfer 
limits, we may have difficulty showing IVF is “deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so 
fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that [it] is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.80  Glucksberg makes a potential constitutional challenge to the embryo 
transfer limits based on a fundamental right to medical autonomy unlikely.  Obviously, we cannot 
claim any deeply rooted tradition regarding IVF specifically, since it is technology created within 
the last thirty years.81  Unlike the case of assisted suicide, however, there has been no historical 
prohibition of ART or IVF.  However, lack of consistent regulation alone might not suffice to 
distinguish IVF.  In Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. circuit applied the Glucksberg analysis in considering a 
challenge to FDA restrictions on access to experimental drugs that passed phase I clinical testing 
by terminally ill patients.82  The court defined it as a right to access experimental drugs, and then 
                                                                 
as one of family, rather than parental, decision-making.  See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, 
and the Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 305 (2010) (arguing Court has 
acknowledged importance of privacy in decisions regarding family and intimate relationships and “protected space for 
family decision-making”). 
75
See infra at n. 237-39 and accompanying text. 
76
497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). 
77
521 U.S. 702, 735-36 (1997). 
78
Id. at 721. 
79
Id. at 727. 
80
Id. 
81
The first so-called “test-tube baby” was Louise Brown, born on July 25, 1978.  See Medicine: Test-Tube 
Baby: It’s a Girl, TIME MAGAZINE ONLINE (Aug. 7, 1978), http://www.time.com/time/magazine 
/article/0,9171,948239,00.html. 
82
Abigail Alliance, 795 F.3d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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held that the right was not “deeply rooted” in the nation’s history and traditions.83  The court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the regulation was deeply rooted because the government did not 
regulate drugs for efficacy until 1962.  In the court’s view, lack of prior government regulation 
“standing alone,” was insufficient to establish a right as a deeply rooted tradition.84  The court 
also cited several cases finding no constitutional right to a specific kind of treatment or to medical 
care without any government interference.85 
However, unlike the rights claimed in Abigail Alliance or Glucksberg (as narrowly 
defined by those courts), the right at stake here links directly to rights that have received 
protection.  We might make a case that fertility treatment has long been recognized as a private 
matter between doctor and patient, looping back to the procreation, abortion and contraception 
cases.  As such, fertility treatment may be considered essential to “ordered liberty.”  We might 
also fight against the hyper-specific articulation of the claimed right and seek a broader 
understanding of tradition.86  Nonetheless, basing a constitutional challenge to embryo transfer 
restrictions solely on a constitutional right to medical autonomy would likely prove unsuccessful.  
As with a claim based on fundamental parental rights, though, long-standing common law 
doctrine surrounding medical treatment will play a key role in our policy analysis.87 
Admittedly the constitutional right to parent is not directly on point, and the Court has 
refrained from characterizing the right to medical autonomy as fundamental.  Nonetheless, as 
discussed above, the well-established fundamental right to procreate should be broad enough to 
encompass a right to access necessary fertility treatments like IVF.  Thus I would argue in favor 
of a theory of procreative liberty that protects choices surrounding reproduction, is grounded 
essentially in protection of autonomy and self-determination, and is bolstered by constitutional 
solicitude for medical and parental decision-making.88 
4.  Standard of Review: Strict Scrutiny or Undue Burden? 
Of course, even if the right to procreate is fundamental and subsumes the right to ART or 
IVF, these precedents merely establish protection from unwarranted government intrusion into 
the procreative decision.  The question is whether the state has sufficient reason and appropriate 
                                                                 
83
Id. at 703.  A dissenting opinion took issue with the majority’s narrow characterization of the right, 
asserting the “claimed fundamental right is to attempt to preserve one’s life.”  Id. at 716 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
84
Id. at 707. 
85
Id. at 710 & n.18. 
86
Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1542-43. 
87
See infra nn. 69 and 239 and accompanying text. 
88
Competing theories regarding the constitutional right to procreate and ART abound. I do not intend a 
thorough assessment of all such theories here.  Suffice to say, that a good case can be made that the right to procreate in its 
most basic sense—creating a genetically related child, as discussed supra note 56, could be justified based on many of the 
theories proffered.  Sonia Suter, for example, would find a right to IVF potentially supported by theories based on 
procreative liberty and autonomy, equality and family privacy.  Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1524-25, 1550, 1561.  
Although a theory based on “history and tradition,” would make recognition difficult, Suter argues that even that theory 
might not foreclose the inclusion of IVF in a right to procreate, though a theory grounded in the protection of bodily 
integrity would.  Id. at 1543, 1546.  See also Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy:  Relationships and Reproductive 
Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1083, 1123 (1998) (defining the right to privacy as a “relational right” and arguing 
that a married couple’s right to reproduce via IVF is protected under that right).  Sonia Suter, for example, would find a 
right to IVF potentially supported by theories based on procreative liberty and autonomy, equality and family privacy. 
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methods for restricting access to ART or prohibiting certain procedures.  Typically, restrictions on 
fundamental rights have been subject to strict scrutiny—requiring the state to provide a 
compelling reason for the infringement and to demonstrate that the means used by the statute to 
achieve its purpose were closely related or narrowly tailored to that end.89  However, the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in this area has at times deviated from this analytical framework.  The most 
recent cases implicating procreation-related rights are the abortion cases, and in these, the Court 
has enunciated a different standard of analysis.90 
Roe v. Wade, the case that first acknowledged abortion as within the fundamental right of 
procreative privacy, did apply the standard “strict scrutiny” analysis, and, in doing so, developed 
the well-known trimester framework for balancing the rights of the woman against the state’s 
interest in protection of potential life, the latter becoming compelling and sufficient to ban 
abortion once the fetus has reached the point of viability, roughly during the third trimester of 
pregnancy.91  However, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court retreated from this approach 
and adopted a new standard—the undue burden standard.92  Under this standard, a state regulation 
of abortion violates due process only if it “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”93 
Assuming that proposed embryo transfer limits would infringe on a fundamental right, it 
is not entirely clear whether a court would analyze a constitutional challenge to ART restrictions 
using the more traditional “strict scrutiny” typically applied to sterilization questions, or whether 
the “undue burden” standard now operative in the abortion context would control.94  In fact, the 
one federal case to consider a constitutional challenge to an ART-related statute applied both 
standards.  In J.R. v. State of Utah,95 a married couple that had entered into a gestational 
surrogacy contract challenged the refusal of the Office of Vital Records to list them as mother and 
father on the birth certificate.  The Office had relied on a Utah statute declaring surrogacy 
contracts unenforceable and declaring the surrogate the mother for all legal purposes.96  The court 
ultimately concluded that the law violated the intended genetic parents’ right to procreate under 
both a strict scrutiny and undue burden analysis, so I will likewise analyze the proposed embryo 
transfer restrictions under both approaches. 
                                                                 
89
See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386, 388, 390-91 (1978) (holding that requiring certain 
individuals to obtain a court order grating permission to marry does not meet strict scrutiny); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that the statutory scheme adopted by the state of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons 
based on racial classification does not survive strict scrutiny). 
90
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 874-76 (1992). 
91
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (1973). 
92
505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
93
Id. at 877-78. 
94
Rosato, supra note 14, at 98.  Cf. Note, supra note 14 (arguing that court would apply intermediate 
scrutiny). 
95
J.R. v. Utah, F.Supp.2d 1268, 1279 (D. Utah 2002). 
96
Id. 
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B. Analyzing the Embryo Transfer Limits 
1. Strict Scrutiny 
If we analyze the proposed restrictions under strict scrutiny, the state must  establish a 
compelling interest in minimizing the number of higher order multiple births.  The state would 
undoubtedly argue that it has a compelling interest in ensuring the welfare of mothers, of children 
and, of potential life as well.  There is no doubt that the more embryos transferred, the greater the 
chance of multiple births and thus the greater the risk of adverse outcomes for the mother and any 
resulting children.97  Common potentially serious complications of multiple order pregnancies for 
the mother include preterm labor and delivery, gestational diabetes and pre-eclampsia, and, for the 
children, increased morbidity and mortality, as well as higher incidences of cerebral palsy,98 
blindness,99 and chronic respiratory problems100 resulting primarily from the preterm birth.101  
Multiple births can also lead to increased maternal depression and anxiety.102 
While the importance of these state goals would seem unassailable, the evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the state’s interests is a bit more complicated than might appear at first glance, 
particularly if the legislation aims primarily to protect future children conceived and born through 
IVF.  As far back as Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court has recognized that the state has at least a 
legitimate interest in protecting potential life.103  Although under Roe, that interest did not rise to 
the level of “compelling” until the fetus had reached the point of viability,104 in Casey, the Court 
declared that the state had a compelling interest in potential life that it could promote throughout 
the pregnancy.105  These cases thus support the state’s interest in protecting potential life.  
However, the state’s interest in potential life in the abortion cases protects beings already 
conceived and developing in the womb.  A question still remains whether the state has a 
compelling interest in the protection of potential lives at the embryo stage.106  In Davis v. Davis, 
                                                                 
97
The Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reproductive Med., Multiple Pregnancy Associated with 
Infertility Therapy, FERTILITY & STERILITY, Vol. 86, Suppl. 4 (Nov. 2006), available at 
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_Guidelines/Educational_Bulletins/
multiple_pregnancy_associated(1).pdf (last accessed Apr. 24, 2010). 
98
Cerebral palsy is a disorder that affects the “brain and nervous system functions such as movement, 
learning, hearing, seeing, and thinking.”  Cerebral Palsy, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000716.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
99
Retinopathy of prematurity is abnormal blood vessel development in the eye, which can occur in a 
premature infant.  Retinopathy of Prematurity, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001618.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
100
Bronchopulmonary dysplasia is a chronic lung condition that can affect newborn babies born 
prematurely.  Bronchopulmonary Dysplasia, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001088.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
101
Multiple Pregnancy Associated with Infertility Therapy, supra note 97. 
102
Id. 
103
Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 837; Carey v. Population Services, 
Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 299, 313 (1980); City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 466 (1983) (citing Harris v. McRae). 
104
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
105
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 876. 
106
Cf. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:123-9:133 (West 2000) (declaring embryos to be “persons” as a matter of state 
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the Tennessee Supreme Court found no such interest, but Davis was relying on Roe v. Wade, 
which found the state’s interest in potential life compelling only at the point of viability.107  It may 
be that after Casey, the state’s interest in potential life could precede initiation of the pregnancy, 
but the question generates complications of logic and philosophy.  If we recognize a state’s 
general and undifferentiated “interest in potential life,” even prior to implantation, analogous to 
the one put forth in the abortion context, we open the door to state efforts requiring donation or 
implantation of embryos, regardless of the parents’ wishes.108  Recognizing such a sweeping state 
interest brings to mind Orwellian science fiction and would pose a grave threat to individual and 
parental autonomy. 
Yet to deny any possibility of state interest also seems wrong.  Surely the state has an 
interest in maximizing the chance that embryos that parents choose to implant will develop into 
healthy children.  However there is an irony and an ontological paradox here.  For those who 
would promote the broader state view—an undifferentiated interest in protecting preimplantation 
life—desirable policy might require transfer of many embryos, in direct contravention of the 
embryo transfer restriction, and thereby increase the risk of harm to any resulting children.109  By 
contrast, those who argue for a narrower state interest—preventing harm to future children—
would actually be promoting the destruction of some embryos to increase the chance for others to 
thrive.  Thus the state’s claim of a compelling interest in preventing harm to future children from 
multiple births might result in them not being born at all.110  Admittedly, it might be possible, in 
some instances, to cryopreserve the non-transferred embryos, which would give them a chance to 
develop in a later cycle or through donation.  But that possibility rests on numerous assumptions 
that are unlikely to prove valid in many cases, including that the embryos could be cyopreserved, 
that the creators would undergo another IVF cycle, or that they would agree to donate any unused 
embryos to someone else for implantation. 
Feminists also face something of a dilemma on this point.  Whenever we acknowledge a 
state interest in protecting potential life—whether  fetal or embryonic—we run the risk of inviting 
state restrictions on women’s reproductive freedom.111  On the other hand, as mothers, feminists 
also see the value and need for protection of women (and their children) from exploitive forces.112  
We can reconcile these seemingly conflicting goals by distinguishing between harms done by 
                                                                 
policy). 
107
842 S.W. 2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992). 
108
The future may be now in this regard.  See infra at nn. 30, 155 and accompanying text (discussing S.B. 
169, Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2009)).  See also Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1527 (questioning whether bans on embryo 
destruction or compelled embryo donation would implicate constitutional right to procreate).  Colorado voters faced 
Amendment 62, which would have defined person as “every human being from the beginning of biological development 
of that human being,” in the Fall 2010 election.  COLORADO GEN. ASSEM., 2010 BALLOT INFO. BOOKLET, RESEARCH PUB. 
NO. 599-1 16-17 (2010). 
109
This paradoxical position appears in reverse where anti-abortion proponents would prohibit termination 
of pregnancies when the child will suffer severe genetic or congenital defects. 
110
See M.A. Roberts, Independent Article, Supernumerary Pregnancy, Collective Harm and Two Forms of 
the Nonidentity Problem, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 776 (2006) (detailing the legal and philosophical analysis of whether 
children born in this situation can be considered harmed). 
111
See Brown, supra note 74, at 103-04; Joyce E. McConnell, Relational and Liberal Feminism: The 
“Ethic of Care,” Fetal Personhood and Autonomy, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 291, 306-07 (1996). 
112
Marjorie M. Schultz, Abortion and Maternal-Fetal Conflict:  Broadening Our Concerns, 1 S. CAL. REV. 
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 79, 81-82 (1992). 
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third parties to the children and to women’s interests as mothers,113 from actions undertaken by 
the mother in the exercise of her reproductive freedom, which may negatively impact her future 
offspring.114  Protecting women as prospective mothers from harm caused by others differs from 
state interventions that pit prospective mothers against their future children.115 
Despite the philosophical, logical, and political conundrum presented, I believe courts 
would ultimately accept without too much difficulty that the state has an interest, maybe even 
compelling one, in trying to prevent creation of children with significant health problems of 
disabilities.116  In fact, the interest may even be stronger than the state’s interest in promoting 
potential life in the abortion context, given that these potential lives must be affirmatively created 
and their protection would not impose physical burdens on the mother.  In addition, the state 
undeniably has a strong interest in protecting women’s health,117 as well as in regulating the 
medical profession and in protecting its ethics and integrity.118 
The constitutionality of proposed embryo transfer restrictions ultimately will turn then, 
under strict scrutiny, on whether the statutory limits are narrowly tailored to achieve those 
purposes.  The ASRM has promulgated practice guidelines119 to reduce the risk of multiple births, 
which under the Missouri bill,120 would presumably have taken on the force of law.  However, 
these guidelines, revised since the octuplets’ birth, do not support a bright line rule regarding 
embryo transfer, as the Georgia bill sets forth, and certainly not one that would limit transfer to 1 
or 2 embryos.  The ASRM recommends a sliding scale based on age of the mother (or egg 
provider).  For example, a woman under age 35 would be limited to 2 embryos transferred, while 
a woman age 38 could receive as many as 4, depending on certain parameters.121  Moreover, the 
Guidelines expressly instruct physicians to take into account individual circumstances and allow 
for upward adjustment for women under certain circumstances, such as two previous failed IVF 
                                                                 
113
See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (recognizing a prenatal tort cause of action 
for children later born alive). 
114
See, e.g., Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring The Debate Over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
721, 744 (2006) (distinguishing termination of pregnancy by abortion from termination by “third party killers” addressed 
in fetal homicide statutes). 
115
See generally Reva Siegel, Reasoning From The Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation 
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992). 
116
See Garrison, infra note 208, at 1640 (arguing that once embryo has been “selected for birth, “ state has 
interest in protecting future child against health risks “comparable to those that the state offers to current children” because 
burden of harm, vulnerability and inability to consent apply equally for prebirth children); Noah, supra note 15, at 661-63 
(analogizing to accepted FDA regulation of severely teratogenic agents, such as DES); Rao, supra note 14, at 1479 
(supporting ban on cloning to further state interest in advancing welfare of children); Note, supra note 14, at 2810 
(predicting that reasonable regulations of IVF aimed at protecting mothers and children would be upheld). 
117
Cf. Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 116 (recognizing state’s interest in protecting woman’s health as sufficient 
justification for regulation of abortion pre-viability). 
118
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007). 
119
Multiple Pregnancy Associated with Infertility Therapy, supra note 97. 
120
See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
121
The Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reproductive Med. & The Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for 
Assisted Reproductive Tech., Guidelines on Number of Embryos Transferred, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY, no. 5, Nov. 
2009, at 1518- 19, available at http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/ 
Practice_Guidelines/Guidelines_and_Minimum_Standards/Guidelines_on_number_of_embryos(1). pdf. 
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attempts or other indicia of a less favorable prognosis.122 
Moreover, multiple births result from a variety of causes.  Significantly, ovarian 
induction and super-ovulation, two kinds of fertility drug treatments, are actually responsible for a 
greater percentage of high-order multiple gestations than ART.123  Yet calls for legislative 
restrictions on use of fertility drugs have been rare.124  Moreover, the number of twin births 
resulting from causes other than ART far exceeds the number resulting from ART, though ART 
certainly has contributed to an increase.125  Indeed, the rise in multiple births in recent decades 
can likely be attributed in significant part to delays in childbearing, as multiple births increase as 
the mother’s age increases, even for children conceived naturally.126  These facts suggest that if 
the asserted justification is protecting mother and future child health, the regulation is 
significantly under-inclusive.  The regulation is over-inclusive, as well, because not every transfer 
in excess of the stated limit will result in multiple pregnancies or in serious complications for the 
mother or children.  The most recent data from the CDC reveals that even when three or more 
embryos are transferred, of the cycles resulting in live births, most are of singletons, with the 
proportion of higher order multiples a relatively small percentage (under 5%).127 
Inevitably, medical procedures involve some risks.  How much justifies state 
infringement when fundamental rights are at stake?  Any use of IVF may increase risks for 
mothers and children, even when children are born as singletons.128  For example, IVF appears to 
pose an increased risk of placenta previa, a pregnancy complication in which the placenta grows 
                                                                 
122
Id. 
123
Id.; Fertility Drugs Contribute Heavily to Multiple Births, SCIENCEDAILY (Jan. 24, 2010), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/01/100120104002.htm (stating more than one in five multiple births resulted 
from fertility drugs alone). 
124
See Noah, supra note 15 (arguing in favor of FDA bans or restrictions on ovulation-inducing drugs).  Cf. 
Rosato, supra note 14, at 86, 88 (arguing for legal limitations to the number of pre-embryos implanted and licensing 
sanctions against physicians with excessive rate of super-multiples); Strong, infra note 144, at 278-79 (2003) (noting 
suggestion that physicians performing ovarian stimulation be licensed). 
125
Joyce A. Martin et al., National Vital Statistics Reports, Births: Final Data for 2005, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_06.pdf (accessed Apr. 24, 2010) (showing ART therapies alone 
accounting for only 17 percent of twin births). 
126
Victoria Clay Wright et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance 2001, United States, CTR. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL (April 30, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5301a1.htm; MULTIPLE 
PREGNANCY OVERVIEW, NEW YORK PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, http://nyp.org/health/pregnant-mpover.html (last visited 
July 25, 2010).  Feminists need to be wary of policies that directly or indirectly penalize women who delay childbearing.  
For an insightful exploration on the relationship between ART and workplace pressures that lead women to delay 
childbearing at the expense of their fertility, see Michelle Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double 
Bind: The Illusory Choice of Motherhood, 9 J. GEN. RACE & JUSTICE 1 (2005) [hereinafter Goodwin, Double Bind]. 
127
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES:  NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC 
REPORTS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION Table 35, 49 (Dec. 2010).  Recent data from Canada show a 
similar pattern.  Of the cycles transferring three or more embryos, the triplet birth rate was 4.3%.  Joanne Gunby et al., 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) in Canada:  2006 Results from the Canadian ART Register, 93 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 2189, 2196 (May 2010).  Moreover, for all cycles resulting in live birth, overall almost 30% resulted in 
multiples, but only 1.2% were triplets and only one was a quadruplet birth.  Id. at 2191. 
128
Diana B. Welmerink et al., Infertility Treatment Use in Relation to Selected Adverse Birth Outcomes, 94 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 2580 (2010).  See also Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1523, n.57; Rosato, supra note 14, at 
77-78. 
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over the cervix.129  Placenta previa can lead to bleeding, premature delivery and major 
complications, including death, for mother and baby.130  However, the actual percentage of 
women developing placenta previa after infertility treatment (including, but not limited to IVF) 
was still only 2.0, compared to 0.6 for women conceiving spontaneously.131  Thus although the 
percentage of increased risk was high (more than double), 98% of infertile women did not 
experience this complication, and, without treatment, would not have been able to conceive and 
carry a child to term.  Moreover, the authors could not conclusively determine whether the 
increased risk of placenta previa (and other conditions observed) resulted from the treatment itself 
or some characteristic inherent in the conceiving couple.132  Would the increased risk of placenta 
previa warrant a prohibition on all IVF?  It seems highly unlikely.133  Similarly, a prenatal 
diagnostic test, chorionic villi sampling (CVS) poses a nearly two percent risk of miscarriage, yet 
no one has suggested legislatively banning the procedure, and it is a commonly used screening 
method.134 
Ultimately, no bright-line rule tells us when a given procedure or treatment poses too 
great a risk of harm to justify its use. Rather, physicians operating under principles of ethics and 
tort law, as well as regulatory agencies, rely on cost-benefit analysis, as do courts.135 As a frame 
of reference, one commentator argued against mandatory anti-retroviral treatment for HIV 
positive pregnant women, stating: “Because the risk of HIV infection to the child, absent antiviral 
treatment is approximately one in four, a decision by a mother to “play the odds” cannot clearly 
be characterized as not in the child’s best interest.”136  By contrast, in Pemberton v. Tallahassee 
Mem. Reg. Med. Cen., Inc.,137 a federal district court found that a risk of uterine rupture estimated 
from 2 to 10 percent (depending on the expert testifying), which would have created a 50 percent 
chance of fetal death, was sufficient to compel a cesarean section without the woman’s consent. 
In advocating for embryo transfer restrictions, a state would have difficulty establishing 
that the risk of serious health problems for the mother and child is sufficient to limit legislatively 
the number of embryos transferred, given that such a limit could effectively preclude the birth of a 
                                                                 
129
Welmerink, supra note 128. 
130
Placenta Previa, GOOGLE HEALTH, https://health.google.com/health/ref/Placenta+previa (last visited 
June 28, 2010). 
131
Welmerink, supra note 128, at Table 2. 
132
Id. 
133
But cf. Noah, supra note 15, at 652 (suggesting that the FDA might prevent the use of intracytoplasmic 
sperm injection (ICSI) if it causes increases in birth defects following IVF). 
134
Antenatal Testing, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILDREN’S HEALTH,  http://www.healthofchildren.com/A/ 
Antenatal-Testing.html (last visited June 28, 2010). 
135
The use of cost-benefit analysis, rather than specific standards, remains a cornerstone of tort law.  See 
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, 277, 340 (2000).  Judge Learned Hand expressed this idea algebraically in the 
famous case United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  Similarly, the FDA weighs risks and benefits 
in deciding whether to approve drugs.  Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, A Drug By Any Other Name . . . ?: Paradoxes In 
Dietary Supplement Risk Regulation, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.165, 187 (2006) (“Thus, balancing of risks and benefits is 
fundamental to the process of evaluating a new drug, and the agency may opt to tolerate very serious risks if the product 
offers a novel and important benefit.”). 
136
Michael A. Grizzi, Recent Developments: Compelled Antiviral Treatment of HIV Positive Pregnant 
Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 473, 489-490 (1995). 
137
66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1253 (N.D. Fla. 1999). 
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child altogether and given that the prevailing medical consensus in the United States underlines 
the need for individualized determination in each case.138  Even reproductive endocrinologists 
seeking to promote single embryo transfer note the difficulty of determining when it is 
appropriate.139  These authors note that optimal treatment may involve a “heavy load transfer”—
transfer of a high number of embryos—for certain groups of women who may need it to initiate 
and sustain pregnancies of any kind.140 
There are also alternative ways of achieving the state’s goals, including improved 
education of patients and enhanced informed consent regarding the risks of transferring multiple 
embryos, as well as policing by state medical boards and professional societies.  In fact, some 
evidence suggests that self-regulatory efforts have had some impact in stabilizing the rate of twin 
births and reducing the incidence of higher order multiples resulting from ART.141  Multifetal 
reduction is also an option that leaves the decision in the hands of the woman and her doctor.142  
Multifetal reduction involves the termination by injection of one or more of the developing 
fetuses in order to reduce the pregnancy to a safer size.143  However, some view multifetal 
reduction as a negative by-product of excessive embryo transfer, rather than as a desirable 
alternative to carrying a multifetal pregnancy to term.  It can pose risks to the remaining fetuses, 
and some women object to the procedure for religious, philosophical, emotional, or other 
reasons.144 
Supporters of a transfer limit can also argue that the dramatic increase in serious 
complications for mother and child once the number of embryos transferred exceeds two justifies 
the restrictions.  The fact that other causes of multiple births remain does not mean the restriction 
                                                                 
138
See ASRM guidelines discussed supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
139
Gerris & De Sutter, supra note 34, at 62-63. 
140
Id. at 62. 
141
See Joyce A. Martin, et al., Center for Disease Control, Births: Final Data for 2006, 57 NAT’L VITAL 
STATISTICS REPS., NO. 7, JAN. 7, 2009. (reporting stabilization in the rate of twin births and continued decline in the rate of 
higher order multiple births and noting the effect of ASRM guidelines on declines in embryo transfers), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_07.pdf; Multiple Pregnancy Associated with Infertility Therapy, supra 
note 97 (noting that the rate of twin pregnancies remained stable while the “number of triplet or greater pregnancies 
resulting from ART cycles has decreased from 7.0% in 1996 to 3.8% in 2002, and to 3.2% in 2003”).  See also Ulla Britt 
Wennerholm, The Risks Associated with Multiple Pregnancy, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER (Gerris et al., eds., 2009).  
But see Gunby, supra note 127 at 2198 (noting the “lack of progress in reducing multiple births” from 2005 to 2006, 
despite practitioners being “close” to meeting recommendations similar to ASRM guidelines for the number of embryos 
transferred). 
142
Noah, supra note 15, at 654-55 (2003); Mark I. Evans & David W. Britt, Multifetal Pregnancy 
Reduction, GLOBAL LIBRARY OF WOMEN’S MED., http://www.glowm.com/index.html?p=glowm.cm 
l/section_view&articleid=214 (last visited June 22, 2010). 
143
Stacey Pinchuk, A Difficult Choice in a Different Voice:  Multiple Births, Selective Reduction and 
Abortion, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 29, 30 (2000). 
144
See Multiple Pregnancy Associated with Infertility Therapy, supra note 97; Adamson, supra note 14, at 
253; Carson Strong, Too Many Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, And So On: A Call For New Priorities, 31 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 272, 275 (2003); Sivinski, supra note 34, at 906; Liza Mundy, Too Much to Carry? WASH. POST, May 20, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/15/AR2007051501730.html. 
 Undoubtedly because of its resemblance to abortion, it is almost impossible to imagine the enactment of 
legislation compelling multifetal reduction or that a court would sustain it as a constitutional matter, yet many have little 
difficulty calling for embryo transfer restrictions that effectively foreclose procreation for some women. 
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on this particular cause is not narrowly tailored.  Certainly when it comes to pharmaceutical 
agents affecting reproduction, we know the state has the power to restrict or prohibit access 
altogether for agents deemed to pose unacceptable health risks.145  Thus even if strict scrutiny 
applied, a court might uphold an embryo transfer restriction statute. 
2.  The Undue Burden Standard 
How does the analysis change under the undue burden approach?  The Supreme Court 
has defined an undue burden as one that places “. . . a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion . . .,”146 or, in this case, seeking to procreate.  In other words, how 
burdensome is the restriction?  The proper method of quantifying that burden has generated 
controversy and confusion.147  In evaluating a provision requiring spousal notification before a 
woman could obtain an abortion Casey stated, “The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the 
group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”148  Casey 
defined the target group as those directly affected by the legislation: married women who wish to 
have an abortion without notifying their husbands, and who do not fit into one of the statutory 
exceptions.  For a “large fraction” of those cases, the spousal notice requirement operated as a 
substantial obstacle and was thus unconstitutional.149  By analogy then, the question in the present 
analysis would be whether the embryo transfer restriction would pose a substantial obstacle for 
those women who want to exceed the statutory limit. 
For a woman who is unlikely to get pregnant and successfully carry a child to term if 
limited to transfer of the specified number of embryos, the burden would indeed be substantial.  
Options might include undergoing additional cycles of fresh IVF, with the attendant risks of 
ovarian stimulation and retrieval150 and which might not provide eggs or embryos of sufficient 
                                                                 
145
See What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/Basics/ucm194879.htm (last visited June 30, 2010); FDA Fundamentals, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Basics/ucm192695.htm (last visited June 30, 2010). 
146
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 878. 
147
See id. at 886-87 (“We . . . disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the ‘particularly 
burdensome’ effects of the waiting period on some women require its invalidation.  A particular burden is not of necessity 
a substantial obstacle. Whether a burden falls on a particular group is a distinct inquiry from whether it is a substantial 
obstacle even as to the women in that group.”); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 188 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting majority’s use of “large fraction” analysis of undue burden when judging lack of health exception to partial-birth 
abortion ban).  For additional discussion, see generally Beth A. Burskstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and 
Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97 (2010); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the 
Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291 (2010); Helena 
Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, A Minor: Fetal Representation in Hearings to Waive Parental Consent for 
Abortion 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 73-76 (2001) (discussing whether a parental consent requirement for minors 
seeking abortion amounts to a substantial obstacle); Hannah Stahle, Fetal Pain Legislation: An Undue Burden, 10 
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 251 (2007) (discussing fetal pain statutes and the obstacles they put on a physician’s ability to 
perform an abortion, and whether this amounts to a substantial obstacle for woman); Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to 
Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359 (2009) 
(discussing forced ultrasounds). 
148
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 894. 
149
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 894-95. 
150
Some women who take fertility medicine to stimulate egg production develop ovarian hyperstimulation 
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quality;151 using frozen embryos, if any are available;152 and in either case, considerable additional 
expense,153 which may well be prohibitive.  Moreover, in some cases the restriction would 
effectively prevent procreation, similar to the women for whom a spousal notice requirement 
would essentially block their right to an abortion.  Women older than 40 or with a history of poor 
ovarian response or previous failed IVF attempts would fall into this category.154 
This problem is particularly acute under the Georgia bill.  In addition to limiting the 
number of embryos transferred to three for women older than 40, it prohibits physicians from 
creating more than that number of embryos in a given IVF cycle (to avoid the possibility of 
destroying the excess embryos).155  This provision would further increase the burden on affected 
women, as the quality of the embryo plays a key role in assessing how many embryos to transfer 
in order to optimize the chance of a successful pregnancy.156  Quality can only be determined by 
allowing the embryo to develop after fertilization.157  Thus, a woman who fertilizes the maximum 
number allowed for transfer might well end up with fewer embryos of sufficient quality for 
transfer, further impairing her chance of initiating a successful pregnancy. 
                                                                 
syndrome (OHSS).  OHSS can cause significant weight gain in a short period of time, reduced urination, severe pain or 
swelling in the abdomen, and, in rare cases, life threatening complications.  Nat’l Insts. of Health, Ovarian 
Hyperstimulation Syndrome, MEDILINEPLUS, , http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007294.htm (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2010); Mayo Clinic staff, Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, MAYOCLINIC.COM, 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/ovarian-hyperstimulation-syndrome-ohss/DS01097/METHOD=print (last visited Aug. 
16, 2010). 
151
Jonathan Van Blerkom, An Overview of Determinants of Oocyte and Embryo Developmental 
Competence:  Specificity, Accuracy and Applicability in Clinical IVF, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 17 (Gerris, et al., 
eds., 2009). 
152
The availability of extra embryos for freezing decreases sharply with age.  Saswati Sunderam et al., 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance – United States, 2006, 58 Center for Disease Control Surveillance 
Summaries, no. SS—5, June 12, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml 
/ss5805a1.htm?s_cid=ss5805a1_x [hereinafter Sunderam, Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance], (transfers with 
frozen embryos have a lower success rate than with fresh).  See 2005 Assisted Reproductive Technology Report: Section 
3—ART Cycles Using Frozen, Nondonor Embryos, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov 
/ART/ART2005/sect3_fig42-43.htm#f42 (last visited Apr. 24, 2010) (showing use of transfers of thawed embryos results 
in live births only 28% of the time compared to transfers using fresh results in live births 34.3% of the time).  In addition, 
some embryos may not survive the thawing process.  See Aila Tiitinen, Cryo-Augmentation After Single Embryo Transfer:  
The European Experience, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 121, 124 (Jan Gerris, et al., eds. 2009). 
153
See, e.g., Jim Hawkins, Financing Fertility, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 115 (2010) (noting that one 
treatment of IVF costs over $12,000 for a single cycle); Mary Shedden, The Financial Challenge of Overcoming 
Infertility, WRBL NEWS, http://www2.wrbl.com/rbl/news/local/article/the_financial_challenge_of_overcoming_infertility/ 
145053/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
154
Gerris & De Sutter, supra note 34, at 62. 
155
S.B. 169, Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced).  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
156
Mark Henderson, Embryo ‘Quality Check’ Could Double IVF Success Rate, THE TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/article5119721.ece; John M. Norian et al., An American Perspective on 
Single Embryo Transfer, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 272 (Jan Gerris, et al., eds., 2009). 
157
Lynette Scott, Sequential Embryo Selection for Single Embryo Transfer, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 
109-16 (Jan Gerris, et al., eds., 2009).  Transfer of blastocysts on day 5 or 6 after fertilization has a higher implantation 
rate than embryos transferred at day 2 or 3 after fertilization, though not all embryos will survive to the blastocyst stage 
and blastocyst transfer carries its own risks.  See Adamson, supra note 14, at 252. 
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However, Carhart v. Gonzales158 casts considerable doubt on the persuasiveness of this 
argument.  In Carhart, the Court upheld a federal law that prohibited a specific medical 
procedure—dilation and evacuation (“D & E”), also known as partial-birth abortion —using the 
undue burden standard.159  The Carhart Court seemed to veer away from the Casey mode of 
analysis, suggesting that the proper method was to evaluate the percentage of women negatively 
affected by the restriction compared to the total number of women undergoing the procedure.160  
If so, it is possible that out of the entire population of women undergoing IVF, relatively few 
women will be affected by the restriction. Under this analysis, the statute might not impose an 
undue burden. 
The Court upheld the law in Carhart even though it admitted that there is uncertainty 
about whether the prohibition of the D & E procedure would put women’s health at risk.161 The 
Court also took pains to emphasize that abortion doctors were subject to the same treatment as 
other physicians; in other words, like other doctors, they were not entitled to “unfettered choice in 
the course of their medical practice.”162  Carhart makes clear that the state interest in protecting 
potential life and the integrity of the medical profession can justify prohibitions on specific 
medical procedures, despite their potential efficacy in effectuating women’s reproductive choices 
and even if the available alternatives might pose additional risks to a woman’s health.  Neither the 
prospect of additional expense, inconvenience, or even additional risks to mother’s health sufficed 
to establish an undue burden.163 
Given the availability of cryopreservation of excess embryos as an alternative, Carhart 
provides considerable support for a court to uphold embryo transfer restrictions.  However, even 
Carhart acknowledged that the ban on partial-birth abortion might be unconstitutional as applied 
to a woman whose health would be seriously compromised by use of another late-term 
procedure.164  Hence an “as applied” challenge to an embryo transfer restriction might succeed 
where a facial attack would not. However, the difficulty of actually finding plaintiffs to pursue 
such a challenge, given the long timeframe of litigation, would render this option more illusory 
than real.165  The chance of a woman achieving a live birth through IVF decreases dramatically as 
she ages, at least when she is using her own eggs.166  Moreover, decisions about how many 
embryos to transfer typically depend on how many of them successfully fertilize and develop and 
                                                                 
158
550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
159
Id. at 156. 
160
Id. at 140 (examining the percentage certain abortion procedures used in second-trimester abortions).  
Justice Ginsburg attacked the majority for misapplying the Casey test.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 188 (2007) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority’s use of the “large fraction” analysis of undue burden when judging lack of a 
health exception to the partial-birth abortion ban). 
161
Id. at 162. 
162
Id. at 163. 
163
Carhart, 550 U.S.  at 164, 166. 
164
Id. at 167. 
165
See Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1575 (noting the difficulty of mounting an as applied challenge 
to the partial birth abortion statute) and at n.345 (discussing the controversy about the standards for facial constitutional 
challenges in abortion cases); Carhart, 550 U.S. at 89-90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing inadvisability of relying on 
as applied challenge). 
166
SUNDERAM, supra note 152.  The chance of a live birth for a woman as she ages may decrease even for 
women using donor eggs in certain circumstances, though the decline is slight.  Id. 
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on the quality of the embryos.167  Hence the need to transfer more than some statutory limit might 
not be apparent until the day of the scheduled embryo transfer.  Any delay would render the 
problem moot, as careful timing is essential to the procedure.  The only alternative would be to 
cryopreserve any excess embryos, again requiring the additional expense and physical burdens of 
another cycle of IVF.168 
Thus, although I believe there are strong arguments in favor of a constitutional challenge 
to transfer restrictions, jurisprudence in this area is far from coherent and the ultimate resolution is 
clearly open to debate. The question then becomes whether, even if restrictions could pass 
constitutional muster, they constitute good policy. 
III.  “BAD” MOTHERS LEAD TO BAD POLICY 
The strongest argument in favor of an embryo transfer restriction is that it has the 
potential to further reduce the risk of multiple births and their attendant problems.  While I argue 
that physicians and patients can exercise appropriate medical judgment without legislative 
interference and should be left to do so, I am aware that for reasons both financial and emotional, 
patients may exert pressure on physicians to pursue more aggressive treatment than they would 
otherwise recommend.169  The widespread dearth of insurance coverage coupled with the high 
cost of fertility treatment may lead patients to seek to maximize their chances in any given cycle, 
even at the risk of increasing the odds of a multiple birth.170  Indeed, some patients, especially 
those using surrogate carriers, may actively seek twins as a cost and stress saving measure.171  
                                                                 
167
Guidelines on Number of Embryos Transferred, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1518 (2009); John M. 
Norian, et al., An American Perspective on Single Embryo Transfer, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 274 (Jan Gerris et al., 
eds., 2009) (discussing the need to determine number of embryos for transfer based on embryo quality and age); Michelle 
Brandt, Stanford Researchers Find Way to Predict IVF Success, STANFORD SCHOOL OF MED. (July 1, 2008),  
http://med.stanford.edu/news_releases/2008/july/IVF.html.  R. Dale McClure, Birth of Octuplets Raises Questions, WASH. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at M13 (“When making a recommendation, the physician takes into account the diagnosis of the 
patient, her age, her prior experiences with medical treatment and the quality and quantity of embryos available”). 
168
Of course, physicians might bring the challenge instead and could avoid the mootness problem, as they 
would likely repeatedly encounter women patients needing to exceed the statutory limit without time to litigate the 
question.  See Federal Election Commission v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (discussing “established 
exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review”).  However, even this option would not 
protect women in all cases.  The reasons why a patient might need to transfer more than the legislative limit vary widely.  
Capturing the range of situations would likely require multiple lawsuits, which still might not account for all situations.  
As Justice Ginsburg noted in Carhart, relying on an “‘as-applied challenge in a discrete case’ . . . jeopardizes women’s 
health and places doctors in an untenable position.  Even if courts were able to carve out exceptions through piecemeal 
litigation for ‘discrete and well-defined instances,’ women whose circumstances have not been anticipated by prior 
litigation could well be left unprotected.”  Carhart, 550 U.S. at 190 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
169
Sivinski, supra note 34, at 901-05 (2010); Strong, supra note 144, at 275; MAKING THE RIGHT CHOICES 
WHEN IT COMES TO MULTIPLES, YALE FERTILITY CTR. (Apr. 24, 2010), http://medicine.yale.edu/ysminfo 
/top_story/2009/03/06032009.html. 
170
Hawkins, supra note 153, at 157. 
171
Mundy, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE, supra note 33, at 214.  See also Mary D’Alton, Infertility and the 
Desire for Multiple Births, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 523 (2004) (noting that 20% of women surveyed in study by Ginny 
L. Ryan et al., preferred multiple birth; 94% seeking twins); Guido Pennings, Philosophical and Ethical Considerations on 
Single Embryo Transfer, in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 200 (Jan Gerris et al., eds., 2009). 
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Age and notions of ideal family configuration may also play a role in patient preferences.172  
Physicians are also under pressure to post high success rates, which may influence their decisions 
about the number of embryos to transfer.173  These legitimate concerns, though, are far 
outweighed by the context in which the debate about this issue is taking place. 
A.  Putting the Restrictions into Context: Another Salvo in the War on Women’s Reproductive 
Freedom and Medical Autonomy 
We cannot view legislative responses to the Suleman case in isolation.  Efforts to limit 
access to and regulate the practice of ART have been driven, at least in part, by pro-life advocates 
whose goal is to further erode women’s reproductive freedom. They have had considerable 
success in recent years in the courts and legislatively in chipping away at a woman’s right to 
choose.174  The Supreme Court’s most recent abortion decision in Carhart boldly undermined 
women’s right to choose by upholding a ban on a late-term abortion procedure, despite ample 
evidence of the risk to women’s health in doing so.175 
The same forces are at work here, and their influence sets the United States apart from 
other countries that regulate the number of embryos transferred.176 The Missouri bill, which 
would establish American Society of Reproductive Medicine guidelines as legal limits on 
transfer,177 was introduced by Robert Schaaf,178 a self-identified anti-abortion and anti-stem cell 
research Christian physician, and Gayle Kingery,179 also a pro-life Republican and sponsor of a 
2007 bill that would prohibit minors from consenting to prescription contraception without a court 
order.180  As for the Georgia bill, it goes significantly beyond restricting the number of embryos 
for transfer.  Titled the “Ethical Treatment of Human Embryos Act,” it would, among other 
things, prohibit stem cell research, declare that a human embryo is a “biological human being who 
is not the property of any person or entity,” nullify any contract that describes the embryo in such 
terms, prohibit intentional destruction of any embryo and resolve disputes over embryos 
                                                                 
172
Pennings, supra note 171 at 202. 
173
See, e.g., Strong, supra note 144, at 275; Sivinski, supra note 34, at 905; Rosato, supra note 14, at 72; 
Pinchuk, supra note 143, at 50-52.  This concern appears to be overblown. 
174
See generally State Policies in Brief, An Overview of Abortion Laws, THE GUTTMACHER INST., 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf; State Policies in Brief, Counseling and Waiting Periods for 
Abortion, THE GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf; Rachel Benson Gold, 
All That’s Old is New Again: The Long Campaign to Persuade Women to Forego Abortion, GUTTMACHER POL. REV. 19 
(Spring 2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/12/2/gpr120219.html. 
175
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164, 166 (2007). 
176
See Strong, supra note 144, at 279 (noting difference between strength of anti-abortion groups in U.S. 
and in Great Britain and observing relative lack of “excessive politicization” in embryo transfer regulation in Britain). 
177
H. B. 810, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009). 
178
Rep. Robert Schaaf, Dist. 028, Republican, MISSOURI HOUSE OF REPS., 
http://house.mo.gov/bio.aspx?year=2010&district=028 (last visited  Nov. 8, 2010); Issues, ROBERT SCHAAF FOR STATE 
SENATE, http://www.schaafforsenate.com/issues (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
179
Representative Gayle Kingery, District 154, Republican, MISSOURI HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://house.mo.gov/bio.aspx?year=2010&district=154 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
180
H.B. 617, 94th Gen. Assemb. (Mo. 2007) (prohibiting a minor from self-consenting for a prescription 
for a contraceptive drug or device unless a petition is granted by a juvenile court). 
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according to the “best interest” of the embryo, thus largely stripping the creators of the embryos—
the intended parents—of control over the embryos’ fate.181 
Moreover, I am deeply skeptical of the state’s effort to micromanage the doctor-patient 
relationship in this arena, given its track record involving other aspects of women’s medical care 
related to reproduction—namely abortion and state interference with pregnant women’s conduct.  
The devolution of informed consent doctrine in the area of women’s reproduction provides a 
telling case in point.  For at least a half century, courts have recognized the importance of patient 
autonomy and the critical role informed consent plays in safeguarding the exercise of that 
autonomy.182  Informed consent aims to ensure that patients make the ultimate decisions about 
their health care by requiring that physicians provide sufficient information for them to do so.183  
Doctors who fail to disclose adequate information about the proposed treatment face civil 
liability.184  Modern informed consent doctrine rejects the paternalistic model of “doctor knows 
best” that previously dominated.  Current models of informed consent envision collaboration 
between patient and doctor to facilitate the patient’s exercise of her autonomy.185 
Yet recent cases and statutes have severely undercut that autonomy for women while at 
times imposing onerous obligations on physicians.  Carhart asserted that by prohibiting the D & 
E medical procedure, it was merely treating abortion doctors like any other physicians.  However, 
looking at regulation of medical procedures generally, legislators have subjected doctors involved 
with women’s reproductive health to unprecedented regulation and most often in a patronizing 
way that particularly burdens the woman’s exercise of reproductive freedom.186  A Westlaw 
survey of statutes dealing with informed consent reveals three primary areas of regulation: mental 
health treatment, medical treatment of minors, and treatment related to women’s reproduction.187  
Once again, we see women classified with children and the mentally ill.188 
More than half the states have enacted abortion statutes that impose waiting periods 
                                                                 
181
S.B. 169, Gen. Assemb. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced).  The Georgia bill avoids the paradox identified 
earlier of elevating the interests of the embryo in life while limiting the number allowed for implantation, by prohibiting 
physicians from creating more embryos than permitted for transfer.  See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
182
See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that doctors have a duty to 
disclose); Cruzan v. Director ,Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
183
Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 924 (1994). 
184
Id. at 927. 
185
Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 48 (2002).  See also Sharon N. Covington, Counseling 
Patients for Single Embryo Transfer in SINGLE EMBRYO TRANSFER 154 (Jan Gerris et al., eds., 2009) (describing shared 
decision making as “model of choice for complex medical decisions involving more than one reasonable treatment 
option”); Tracy Dobson, Medical Malpractice in the Birthplace:  Resolving the Physician-Patient Conflict Through 
Informed Consent, Standard of Care, and Assumption of Risk, 65 NEB. L. REV. 655, 684 (1986) (advocating for shared 
decision-making and patient self-determination in birth related decisions). 
186
See B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 549 
(2009) (observing the “uniquely onerous regulation of abortion” and noting that “many of the legal restrictions that apply 
to abortion providers would probably strike other physicians as outrageous if applied to them”). 
187
The following search was run on July 14, 2010 in the “all state statutes” and “50 state survey” databases:  
Informed written /s consent /p physician doctor /p treat!. 
188
Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological “Lock-Out” Systems, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1580 (2004) (noting “historical inclusion of women together with children and mentally handicapped 
individuals as legal incompetents”). 
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and/or highly detailed informed consent requirements.189  Legislation recently passed in 
Oklahoma over a gubernatorial veto presents one of the more egregious examples of this kind of 
regulation.  Oklahoma already had a 24-hour waiting period and a requirement that detailed 
“informed consent” materials, including gestational photos, be provided to a woman seeking an 
abortion.190  Oklahoma House Bill 2780, enacted in April 2010, now mandates that a physician 
perform an ultrasound on a woman seeking an abortion prior to obtaining informed consent for 
the procedure.191  Of course, by doing so, the law actually compels the woman to submit to the 
ultrasound procedure regardless of her consent.  The law further requires that the physician 
simultaneously explain what the ultrasound is depicting, display the ultrasound so the woman can 
see the images and give a medical description of the images, including the dimensions of any 
fetus or embryo and the presence of any organs.192  Lest one think the law is unduly coercive, rest 
assured that it contains language expressly allowing the woman not to look: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a pregnant woman from 
averting her eyes from the ultrasound images required to be provided to and 
reviewed with her. Neither the physician, nor the pregnant woman shall be 
subject to any penalty if she refuses to look at the presented ultrasound 
images.193 
The law is silent as to whether the woman can choose to block out the narrative by wearing an I-
Pod or other similar device during the procedure.  Although the Center for Reproductive Rights 
quickly challenged the law and the Oklahoma attorney general has temporarily blocked 
enforcement, the ultimate outcome remains uncertain.194  Nor is the Oklahoma law unique: in 
2010, the Florida legislature passed a similar law, subsequently vetoed by the governor, and 
mandatory ultrasound bills have been introduced in Kentucky, Rhode Island, Montana, and 
Louisiana.195 
Moreover, a recently-enacted Nebraska anti-abortion statute takes the coercion to a new 
level.196  Abortion providers under this statute must now engage in an extremely detailed risk 
                                                                 
189
WHO DECIDES? THE STATUS OF WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, NARAL 
PRO-CHOICE AMERICA 12 (JAN. 2011), available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/government-and-you/who-
decides/who-decides-2011.pdf.  See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,881-87. 
190
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §§ 1-738.2-1-738.3.  Similar requirements in a Kentucky statute, KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 311.725 (West 2009), were largely upheld by a Kentucky court, although a Kentucky requirement of “in 
person” delivery of the materials was ruled unenforceable.  Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F.Supp.2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
191
Act of April 27, 2010, 2010 OKLA. SESS. LAW SERV. 173 (West) (mandating that physicians perform 
ultrasounds on women seeking abortions). 
192
Id. § 2 (A) (2)-(4). 
193
Id.§ 2 (C). 
194
Legal Challenge Blocks Oklahoma Law Requiring Ultrasound Before Abortion, CATH. NEWS AGENCY, 
May 5, 2010, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/legal_challenge_blocks_oklahoma_law_requiring_ultrasound_ 
before_abortion/.  A federal district court in Oklahoma struck down a prior bill containing a similar provision without 
reaching the merits of the ultrasound provision.  Oklahoma Abortion Law Overturned, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/19/nation/na-abortion19. 
195
H.B. 373, 10th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010); H.B. 7489, Gen. Assem. (R.I. 2010); H.B. 280, 62nd Legis. (Mt. 
2011).  S.B. 528, Reg. Sess. (La. 2010). 
196
2010 Nebraska Laws L.B. 594. 
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assessment of women seeking abortions prior to performing the procedure.  The risk assessment 
requires the physician to determine whether the “risks” of bearing the child outweigh the “risks” 
of the abortion, all ostensibly to protect the woman’s mental health.  The statute explicitly defines 
these risks to include “physical, psychological, emotional, demographic, or situational factor[s]” 
as well as “familial” risks.197  How a physician is to evaluate and weigh the extent of the 
“situational” and “familial” risks to the patient is anybody’s guess.  And, of course, the statute 
fails to note the irony of insisting that a woman’s consent to abortion is only “voluntary and 
informed”198 by imposing a requirement that destroys the bedrock of the doctrine of “informed 
consent”—the patient’s right to weigh the risks for herself. 
Some may call foul at the equation of statutes restricting the number of embryos 
transferred and these abortion statutes.  But I believe the connection is real and meaningful.  
While the abortion statutes aim predominantly to curtail abortion as much as possible in order to 
preserve fetal life, a goal openly sanctioned by the Casey Court,199 some who support statutorily 
mandated informed consent for abortion may do so based on genuine concern that women do not 
fully understand the implications and future impact on their well-being that the choice to abort 
may have.  Indeed the Carhart opinion gives credence to this notion, writing that: 
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort 
the infant life they once created and sustained . . . In a decision so fraught with 
emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details 
of the means that will be used . . . .”200 
But rather than simply require informed consent, the Court ultimately “deprives women 
of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.”201  The Court thus 
leaves the state free ostensibly to protect a woman from her own poor decision-making.  Indeed, 
Casey and, even more so, Carhart, have turned the common law doctrine of informed consent on 
its head in a way that, at best, demeans women as autonomous decision-makers, and at worse 
actively coerces them.202  The abortion cases reveal a disturbing trajectory that began with 
rejection of statutorily-mandated informed consent, recognizing that the common law already 
required it.203  Casey moved the trajectory sharply in another direction when it disapproved those 
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2010 Nebraska Laws L.B. 594 (§28-326(11) and §28-327(6)(a)). 
198
2010 Nebraska Laws L.B. 594 (§28-327). 
199
Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. 
200
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).  Interestingly, the Court ignores extensive factual 
findings by the District Courts regarding the harm women will suffer from a ban on D & E, id. at 178-79 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting), but draws this conclusion about women’s anticipated regrets without any evidence at all.  Id. at 159. 
201
Id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
202
Indeed, the very notion, approved by the Court in Casey, that the state can express its interest in 
discouraging abortion through informed consent requirements inherently undermines the foundation of informed consent:  
free, voluntary and knowledgeable decision-making.  Moreover, states have packed their informed consent materials with 
patently false and misleading information.  Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent an Abortion 
Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 251-54 (2009). 
203
Id. at 244-47 (discussing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)). 
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earlier precedents and allowed a state to mandate so-called “informed consent” that the state could 
use to try to persuade a woman not to have an abortion.204  It culminated in Carhart, which 
allowed a state to ban a procedure entirely, at least partly because of concerns that physicians 
would not provide adequate information—thereby completely eliminating the option of any kind 
of “consent.”205 
Mandatory ultrasound statutes like Oklahoma’s pervert the notion of informed consent in 
an even more dramatic fashion.  They actually subject a woman to an invasive medical procedure 
without her consent, in the name of enhancing “informed” consent.206  Likewise, Nebraska’s “risk 
assessment” statute requires a physician to weigh a host of factors having nothing to do with any 
potential health risks to the woman, rather than allow the woman to exercise that judgment 
independently.  These cases and statutes send a very clear message: women are simply incapable 
of making a decision whether to have an abortion and doctors cannot be trusted to give them the 
appropriate information to do so without extreme measures imposed by the state. 
Proposed embryo transfer limits operate the same way as the partial birth abortion ban 
upheld in Casey: they completely bypass the possibility of achieving the desired result through 
true informed consent.  Instead, they prohibit the option altogether.  In doing so, they inject the 
state into the doctor-patient relationship and presume that the woman, left unrestrained, will 
choose an undue risk to herself and the children she desperately seeks.  Indeed, my choice of the 
word “desperate” is intentional, for infertile women are frequently described as being both 
desperate and irrational—and physicians unable or unwilling to resist them, a perception that the 
Suleman case reinforces.  This perception appears in the scholarly literature, as well as in the 
popular press. 207  For example, Professor Marsha Garrison has written that “Regulation aimed at 
protecting future children seems particularly important when the treatment in question is aimed at 
achieving a sought-after pregnancy.  Infertile would-be parents are much less likely than actual 
parents, or even pregnant women who have decided to carry a pregnancy to term, to act in the best 
                                                                 
204
Id. at 252. 
205
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.  In a 2006 article, Samuel Bagenstos anticipated this type of analysis.  He 
argued that the reliance of the abortion cases on an autonomy rationale left open the option of governmental regulation to 
protect actors from threats to their exercise of free choice—be they social, financial or otherwise.  In his view, such an 
argument could be used to justify banning abortion altogether, a prospect that seems paradoxical, to say the least, but was 
nonetheless the path followed in Carhart.  Samuel R. Baganstos, Disability, Life, Death and Choice, 29 HARV. J. L. & 
GENDER 425, 449-51 (2006).  Others too have noted the irony.  See, e.g., Suter, Repugnance, supra note 49, at 1578 
(Justice Kennedy “condones state efforts to prevent uninformed choice by prohibiting choice altogether.  Ronald Dworkin 
highlights the irony of this analysis . . . .”). 
206
Some may argue that ultrasound is only minimally invasive because it requires no bodily incision.  
However, it does require the woman to lie on a table and submit to the application of gel and movement of the wand over 
her abdominal area.  Moreover, transvaginal ultrasound, increasingly performed in the early stages of pregnancy, requires 
insertion of the ultrasound wand into the woman’s vagina—a procedure that would hardly qualify as minimally invasive.  
Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing:  Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 
391-92 (2008). 
207
See, e.g., Strong, supra note 144, at 275; Anna Mulrine, Making Babies It’s an Expensive Gamble, but 
Childless Couples are Trying Reproductive Therapy in Record Numbers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 9, 2004, 
http://health.usnews.com/usnews/health/articles/040927/27babies.htm.  Cf. Mundy, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE, supra 
note 33, at 214 (“Doctors are often eager to shift responsibility onto patients, against whose demands they portray 
themselves as helpless.”). 
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interests of their future children.”208  Professor Jennifer Rosato has expressed similar sentiments: 
“Infertile women will often opt for any treatment option presented, regardless of the physical, 
psychological, or financial price,” including depleting savings and risking foreclosure.209  She 
describes parents using ART as “categorically conflicted,” and caught in an “emotional vortex” 
that “causes them to obsess about conceiving, rather than carefully considering the quality of life 
of the children.  The power of wishful thinking obscures rational deliberation.”210  By 
characterizing infertile women as “categorically conflicted” because of their obsession with 
becoming parents, Rosato can justify intrusive state regulation of ART patients “in ways not 
otherwise tolerated.”211 
No one could credibly deny the emotional and financial stress felt by many of those who 
undergo fertility treatment.  But to denigrate a whole category of women as irrational and 
incapable of acting in their (future) children’s best interests feeds directly into societal stereotypes 
used to deny women autonomy in reproduction, medical decision-making and parenting.  Indeed, 
our common acceptance of the term “Octomom,” is itself revealing—we have reduced her to a 
grotesque caricature of motherhood; she’s a creature, barely human and certainly not one that in 
any way resembles our vision of a good mother. 
B.  Beyond Abortion: Using “Irrational” Women To Justify State Intervention 
This perception of Suleman, and infertile women generally, as irrational undoubtedly 
fueled the rapid-fire introduction of embryo transfer legislation—a response that seems 
disproportionate given the many causes of pre-term birth and low birth weight.  Rather than focus 
on ensuring adherence to appropriate medical standards, educating patients about the risks of 
multiple births, obtaining true informed consent, and providing insurance coverage or financing 
that reduces the incentive for excessively aggressive treatment, we seek a partial solution, which 
begins with interfering with the doctor-patient relationship, devaluing the decision-making 
capacity of women, and furthering a right-wing agenda that seeks ultimately to control women’s 
reproductive decision-making power. 
We have seen this kind of effort before in response to the problem of drug-exposed 
infants.  Rather than provide adequate treatment, support and prenatal care, which might have 
systemic impact, but requires spending money on a demonized segment of the population, states 
began criminally prosecuting women for exposing their fetuses to drugs in utero.212  In 
Charleston, South Carolina, a public hospital instituted a program compelling drug testing and 
other measures of pregnant women who were suspected of drug use and came to the hospital to 
deliver their babies.213  Positive results were forwarded to law enforcement, which used the results 
to prosecute the women.  The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled the practice a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The Court rejected the city’s attempt to justify the search as a means of 
protecting women and children’s health, as the policy clearly emphasized the goal of prosecuting 
                                                                 
208
Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1642 (2008). 
209
Rosato, supra note 14, at 72 (quoting Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contracts and 
Consents, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 923 (2000)). 
210
Id. at 105-06. 
211
Id. at 106. 
212
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001). 
213
Id. 
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the women and provided no special medical care related to the substance abuse, beyond referral 
for treatment.214  While the Court invalidated the Charleston searches and other criminal 
prosecutions of pregnant women have been overturned, some have been upheld.215  Moreover, 
subjecting women to prosecution, regardless of the ultimate outcome, subjects them to grievous 
harm.216  The racist and classist aspects of such prosecutions and other state interventions in 
conduct during pregnancy and child-bearing compound the damage and have been well-
documented.217 
Unlike the criminal prosecutions of pregnant drug addicts, proposed restrictions on 
embryo transfer limits are not, generally speaking, directed at a similarly maligned group—
substance abusers and poor women of color.  In fact, most users of ART are affluent whites.218  It 
is all the more telling, then, that the visceral pubic response and the embryo transfer legislation at 
issue here erupted in response to a woman who does not fit the norm.  Suleman’s choice to pursue 
repeated courses of IVF as a single, unemployed mother (not to mention a woman of color)219 
makes her look, if not criminal like the pregnant drug abusers, at best lacking in judgment and at 
worst, downright crazy and a danger to all her children.  This depiction of irrational near-
criminality is especially pernicious when applied to women in this context who are actively 
seeking to become mothers, because it violates societal norms defining what “good” mothers 
should be.  As Andrew Taslitz argued in considering the (mal)treatment of pregnant drug abusers 
at issue in Ferguson, the “stigmatizing rage” felt toward these women reflected the violation of 
societal norms about motherhood: 
To be a mother in our culture is to take upon oneself the obligations of 
“preservative love, nurturance, and training” of one’s children as a substantial 
life responsibility.  Preservation of the child’s physical health and security is 
historically the preeminent of these demands.  “A mother who callously 
endangers her child’s well-being is simply not doing maternal work.”  Indeed, 
when such endangerment is intentional or extreme, the mother becomes a 
“monster,” a hideous creature whose very survival endangers all that holds 
society together.  Children, hearth, and home collapse when a mother fails to fit 
her assigned role.220 
                                                                 
214
Id. at 82. 
215
See, e.g., Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1 (1997) (child abuse conviction against mother based on ingesting 
crack cocaine during the third trimester of pregnancy upheld); Jim McBride, Newborn Twins on Drugs at Birth, 
AMARILLO GLOBE NEWS (June 12, 2004), http://www.amarillo.com/stories/061204/new_twindrugs.shtml) (describing the 
first woman prosecuted on charges of delivery of marijuana to a minor for smoking marijuana while pregnant). 
216
See Meghan Horn, Mothers Versus Babies: Constitutional and Policy Problems With Prosecutions for 
Prenatal Maternal Substance Abuse, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 635, 638 (2008) (discussing cases where mothers 
spent time in jail awaiting appeal for convictions relating to prenatal drug use). 
217
Id. at 648-49; Andrea Marsh, Testing Pregnant Women and Newborns for HIV:  Legal and Ethical 
Responses to Public Health Efforts to Prevent Pediatric AIDS, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 195, 207-09; 211-12 (2001). 
218
Rao, supra note 14, at 1478 (2008). 
219
Suleman is of middle-eastern descent.  Her father is Iraqi.  Octuplets’ Family Filed For Bankruptcy, 
CBS NEWS (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/30/earlyshow/health/main4764432.shtml. 
220
Taslitz, supra note 185, at 75 (quoting Sara Ruddick, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF 
PEACE 17-18 (1995)). 
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Nor can we ignore the racist and classist aspects of the societal response to Suleman.  
Public reaction to her stands in dramatic contrast to the reaction to the birth of the McCaughey 
septuplets a dozen years earlier to a white, religious married couple.  The media greeted the 
McCaughey birth with amazement, kudos and virtually no criticism of the family and very little of 
the physician.221  Granted there were differences aside from race/ethnicity and marital and 
employment status that set Suleman apart: She used IVF (as opposed to fertility drugs) and she 
had six previous children conceived through IVF.  By contrast, the McCaugheys had one previous 
child, conceived with the help of a fertility drug.222  Nonetheless, the response to another high 
order multiple birth, around the same time as the McCaughey birth, gives us cause for concern.  
Grace Ochukwu, an African-American, gave birth to octuplets one year after the McCaughey’s.  
The media response, although not approaching the vitriol spewed at Suleman, was nonetheless 
markedly different from that enjoyed by the McCaugheys, prompting at least one commentator to 
posit racism as the only possible explanation.223 
These contemptuous attitudes evoke another line of cases that questioned women’s 
ability to make choices about their reproduction and saw heavy-handed response by the state.  In 
the 1980s and 90s, courts decided several cases involving blood transfusions and C-sections 
performed on pregnant women without their consent.224  These cases, like the restrictions here, 
were justified by the need to protect the health of future born children and, in some cases, the 
woman herself.  While some appellate courts ruled that these actions violated the woman’s 
statutory, common law or constitutional rights,225 others upheld the coercive action.226  In one 
such case, Pemberton v. Tallahassee Reg. Med. Ctr,227 a federal district court in Florida ruled that 
a hospital had not violated a woman’s constitutional rights when it performed a caesarean section 
on her against her will after obtaining an order from the state court.  Enforcement of the court 
order entailed sending a police officer to her home and forcibly transporting her back to the 
hospital by ambulance.228 
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Goodwin, Double Bind, supra note 126, at 40-42. 
222
Michael D. Lemonick, It’s a Miracle, TIME, Dec. 1, 1997, at 34, 38, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,987455-3,00.html (accessed Aug. 15, 2010). 
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Pinchuk, supra note 143, at n.6 (quoting Robert Scheer, Iowa Seven, Houston Eight: A Difference-Only 
Racism Explains Some Reactions to the Year-Apart Multiple Births, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1998, at B7).  See also 
Goodwin, supra note 126, at 40-42. 
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See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cty. Hosp. Authority, 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981); In re Baby Boy 
Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
225
See, e.g., In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding the state may not override a 
pregnant woman’s competent treatment decision to forego a blood transfusion for religious reasons); In re Baby Boy Doe, 
632 N.E.2d at 330 (holding the common law protects the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment and 
thus, a caesarean section, even when the fetus’ health is at risk); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (holding trial court 
should not have ordered c-section without patient’s consent or use of substituted judgment). 
226
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cty. Hosp. Authority, 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).  In Jefferson, the court 
ordered the c-section, but it never took place, as the mother did not return to the hospital.  She subsequently delivered a 
healthy baby vaginally, despite testimony by a physician that the probability of death to her was 50% and death to the 
fetus was 99% if delivered vaginally.  Jefferson, 274 S. E.2d at 458. See also In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (blood transfusion); Crouse Irving Mem. Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) 
(blood transfusion). 
227
66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999). 
228
Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1250. 
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In addition to coercing women’s choices about procreation, legislative limits on the 
number of embryos transferred undercuts women’s authority as prospective parents.  While the 
restriction on embryo transfers, as already discussed, does not directly implicate the constitutional 
right to parent, the law’s treatment of and deference to parental decision-making provide a useful 
frame for viewing analogous decisions by women undergoing IVF to create a family.  We know 
that parents make decisions that subject their children to avoidable risks all the time, and unless 
those risks rise to the level of abuse or neglect, the government, consistent with the Constitution, 
typically may not intervene.229  For example, increasing numbers of parents have refused to 
vaccinate their children based in significant part on unfounded concerns of a link between certain 
vaccinations and autism.230  Despite a strong consensus among medical professionals about the 
overall safety of vaccines,231 no effort has been made to compel vaccination over parental 
objection,232 despite the undeniable benefits, not just to individual children, but also to the public 
health.233  Diseases such as measles and whooping cough (pertussis), once thought to be nearly 
eradicated in the U.S., are now reemerging in significant numbers.234  Although the Supreme 
Court ruled long ago that the state can compel vaccination over parental objection,235 in 48 states 
parents may opt out for religious reasons and in nearly half, based solely on personal 
objections.236  In the context of medical treatment of children, courts have likewise adhered to the 
principle of deference to parental choice unless the parental decision involves rejection of life-
saving treatment237 or, in a few cases, of treatment that would dramatically improve the child’s 
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Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for 
Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2302 (2007); In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 
2132014 (Tex. Ct. App. May 22, 2008) (stating that the Department of Family and Protective Services must show danger 
to physical health or safety of children before removing from home). 
230
Browning v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., No. 02-0928V, 2010 WL 1407212 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 19, 
2010); Immunization, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.aap.org/immunization/ 
multimedia/news.html; An Interview with Dr. Geri Dawson, AUTISM SPEAKS (July 30, 2009), http://www.autismspeaks. 
org/science/science_news/geri_dawson_vaccines_autism_interview.php. 
231
VACCINE STUDIES: EXAMINE THE EVIDENCE, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, http://www.aap.org 
/immunization/families/faq/VaccineStudies.pdf (last accessed Apr. 25, 2010). 
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James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and 
Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 833 (2002) (noting that each state has mandatory vaccination laws that are subject to 
medical, religious, and philosophical objections). 
233
Immunization Safety, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.who.int 
/immunization_safety/en/. 
234
See Serena Gordon, Measles Outbreak Triggered by Unvaccinated Child, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK 
(Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/content/healthday/637218.html; Christine S. Moyer, Pertussis 
Epidemic In California Linked to Vaccination Gaps, AM. MED. NEWS (July 26. 2010), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2010/07/26/prl10726.htm; Whooping Cough Epidemic May Be Worst In 50 Years, CAL. DEP’T. PUB. 
HEALTH, (June 23, 2010), http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Pages/NR10-041.aspx. 
235
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
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States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, NATL. 
CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Oct. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/health/schoolimmunizationexemptionlaws/tabid 
/14376/default.aspx.  See, e.g., Conscientious Objection to Public Health, Interim News, HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., TEXAS 
H. R. (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/interim/int78-1.pdf (describing Texas exemption). 
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quality of life.238  Indeed, more than forty states allow parents to reject even life-saving treatment 
for their children if they are relying on spiritual care.239 
The case for impinging on a parent’s decision-making authority regarding the relative 
risks of IVF is arguably even weaker, since we must acknowledge once again the ontological 
problem embedded in the claim: Women undergoing IVF may expose their future children to 
risks in order to give them life.  With IVF, the choice may not be between a risk of harm to a child 
and a healthy child; it may be between a risk of harm to a child or no child being born at all. 
Finally, our willingness to consider limiting the options for the infertile stands in sharp 
contrast to our treatment of the fertile.  Many people carry risks of serious genetic diseases, which 
they chance passing on to their children.  Yet no legislation requires even genetic testing of the 
parents or preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), which would allow the parents to screen out 
embryos carrying the diseases, let alone attempts to prohibit these individuals from procreating.240  
Nor have scholars advocated for mandatory genetic testing.241 
IV.  REDUCING MULTIPLE BIRTHS WITHOUT UNDERMINING WOMEN’S 
AUTONOMY: CONSIDERING THE OPTIONS 
The goal of reducing multiple births is a worthy one, and legislative limits are not 
without some merit.  They doubtless would reduce the number of multiple births resulting from 
IVF, and they might give “cover” to physicians who have trouble resisting patient entreaties to 
exceed the appropriate number of embryos.  A bill like Missouri H.B. 810, which would give 
ASRM guidelines the force of law, would presumably still allow physicians to take into account 
                                                                 
decision to forgo potentially life-saving treatment for a child, may be deemed so risky to the child’s future well-being that 
it triggers court intervention.”); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972) (finding state has insufficient interest in overruling 
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Adam Lamparello, Taking God Out of the Hospital:  Requiring Parents to Seek Medical Care for Their 
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GAZETTE, May 4, 1989 at Life/Style Section (examining the consequences of genetic testing and inheriting Huntington’s, 
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s, and Tay-Sachs); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub.L. 
No. 110-233 (prohibiting insurance companies and employers from discriminating on the basis of information from 
genetic tests); Mayo Clinic Staff, Huntington’s Disease, MAYO CLINIC (May 8, 2009), http://www.mayoclinic.com 
/health/huntingtonsdisease/DS00401/DSECTION=prevention (recommending genetic counseling or in vitro fertilization 
with pre-implantation screening); Sen. Brown, Rep. Arcuri Introduce Bill to Raise Awareness of Tay-Sachs Disease, US 
FED NEWS SERV., Aug. 1, 2009, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1812791251.html (describing a bill to 
designate September as National Tay-Sachs Awareness Month). 
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Some have suggested voluntary screening.  See Suriya E.P. Jayanti, Guarantors of Our Genes: Are Egg 
Donors Liable For Latent Genetic Disease? 58 AM. U. L. REV. 405, 411, 456-57 (2008) (arguing that egg donors should 
not be held to a duty to warn of known genetic disorder but fertility clinic doctors and egg donation agencies should 
properly screen egg donors); RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, HEREDITY AND HOPE: THE CASE FOR GENETIC SCREENING 
(2008); Sonia M. Suter, Whose Genes are These Anyway? Familial Conflicts Over Access to Genetic Information 91 
MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1905 (1993) (examining the state interest in protecting people from preventable or curable disease 
using genetic testing). 
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the needs of particular patients. 
Nonetheless, legislating restrictions on embryo transfer at this point would be a grave 
mistake for a host of reasons.  First, as we have seen, mandated embryo transfer limits raise 
serious constitutional questions.242  Women affected by the limits can mount a strong case that 
such legislation violates their fundamental right to procreate, although the outcome remains 
uncertain.  Beyond these constitutional concerns, the circumstances surrounding the introduction 
of these bills do not inspire confidence that they were carefully considered.  Rather, they mark a 
visceral reaction to an extreme case.  While we may desire to reduce the number of multiple births 
from IVF, using the cudgel of legislation to achieve that goal seems premature at this point.243  
Multiple births appear to be holding steady or on the decline,244 and publicity regarding the 
octuplets may hasten that trend.  One reproductive endocrinologist commented that her patients 
were showing an increased concern with the number of embryos transferred as “no one wants to 
be the Octomom.”245  In addition, the profession seems more ready to police itself, which should 
deter physicians from overly aggressive transfers.  Compliance with ASRM and SART 
requirements has clearly contributed to a decline in the rate of multiple births.246  Although 
membership in SART is voluntary, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 
1992247 requires reporting of success rates to SART, and more than 90% of all clinics report more 
than 95% of all cycles.248  Clinics that do not report are identified.  Members of SART have 
increasingly followed SART guidelines, including those regarding embryo transfers.  Member 
clinics that have results outside these guidelines must “explain the reasons to SART, develop a 
plan for corrective action and demonstrate improved results in the future, or else lose their SART 
membership.249  Moreover, improved ART techniques may lead to significant changes in the 
guidelines and may obviate the need for regulatory limits.  For example, researchers at Stanford 
Medical School have developed a computer model that can predict the live birth success of an 
IVF cycle with 1000 times more accuracy than current age-based guidelines for patients who have 
undergone a previous IVF cycle.250 
Perhaps even more importantly, we should continue to oppose legislative restrictions on 
embryo transfer because they undermine women’s reproductive, medical, and parental autonomy 
and self-determination.  As we have seen, these restrictions fall in line with other efforts by the 
state to regulate women’s reproduction in a way that furthers sex inequality and oppresses women 
as patients and mothers.  Such legislative restrictions interpose the state in a relationship between 
women and their physicians that should be one of mutual trust.  Nor does Missouri’s deference to 
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the medical profession constitute a panacea.  By giving medical guidelines the force of law, they 
transfer ultimate responsibility for the decision from the woman, where it should reside, to her 
physician.  This result is especially troubling when we consider that physicians have at times 
contributed to the oppression of women’s reproductive freedom, as in the forced c-section cases, 
and the medical establishment has exhibited its own sexist bias across a variety of issues.251  
Legislative embryo transfer restrictions will extend what Michelle Oberman has identified as a 
flawed paradigm of “maternal-fetal conflicts”252 to maternal-embryo conflicts.  Oberman 
recognized that cases of so-called maternal-fetal conflict really involve conflict between the 
woman and her physician.  By structuring the conflict as one between mother and fetus, the doctor 
appears neutral, even though he or she has decided what is in the fetus’ best interests and may, in 
fact, actively pressure or coerce the woman to acquiesce.253  In similar fashion, by legislating the 
permissible number of embryos transferred, a seemingly neutral act, the state erects itself as the 
future children’s protector against the desperate mother. 
There is nothing unique about the fertility industry that requires this kind of regulation.  
True, the woman’s actions impact her future child, but so does every decision a parent makes 
regarding medical care for a child (along with an endless plethora of other decisions).  The 
potential effect on the future child only justifies regulation if we think children need to be 
protected from their prospective mothers and that mothers cannot make a sound decision.  
Likewise, instances of economic incentives for risky medical treatment abound, yet we rely on 
medical ethics and the tort system, as imperfect as they are, to counter physician’s self-interest, 
rather than attempt to dictate by statute specific medical procedures.254  For example, treatment of 
prostate cancer depends very much on which type of physician the patient consults.  A patient 
who consults a radiation oncologist will likely undergo radiation treatment, while one who 
consults a urologist will likely end up having surgery, and one consulting a primary care 
physician may be advised to wait and see.  As the author of one study noted, 
Part of the reason for the emphasis on treatment . . . is the large capital 
investments surgeons make for robotically assisted surgery and that radiation 
therapists make for proton beam therapy or newer techniques of radiation 
therapy.  Moreover, current reimbursement rules do not allow physicians 
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adequate time to educate patients about the pros and cons of the various 
procedures.255 
Indeed, robotic prostate surgery, which now dominates the surgical treatment options, 
may in fact be riskier than traditional open prostatechtomy, but “a lot of community hospitals felt 
the need to be competitive . . . and they acquired these robots and marketed them before there has 
been diffusion of experience among surgeons.”256  Indeed, the notion that physicians may order 
unnecessary tests or promote expensive, but risky, procedures because of concerns with 
competition and compensation is so obvious as to barely warrant mention.  Much more salient, 
though, is the lack of empirical data to support this hypothesis in the IVF context.  Indeed, several 
studies demonstrate the opposite: that increased competition actually decreases high order 
multiple births.257  Hence this concern cannot suffice to justify regulation of ART unless we 
ignore the empirical data and regulate medical treatment in similar fashion across the board. 
A better approach would look for solutions that enhance women’s reproductive and 
parental power rather than undermine it.  Common sense suggests that increased insurance 
coverage would reduce the patient’s financial incentive for excessive embryo transfers, though the 
empirical evidence on this point is not conclusive.258  Other ways to reduce financial pressure on 
patients include refund programs offered by some fertility clinics, tax breaks, and expanded credit 
access for fertility patients.259 
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Enhanced education and emphasis on effective informed consent can also make a 
difference.  Certainly there have been cogent critiques of the limits of informed consent. 
Feminists have criticized the existing model of informed consent in general as an ineffective 
means of ensuring women’s autonomy, given the patriarchal domination of the medical 
profession, as well as societal pressures constraining women’s self determination.260  Much of the 
critique in the ART context centers on deficiencies in informed consent in collaborative 
reproduction, which raises somewhat different concerns (e.g. financial coercion of donors, 
unknown psychological risks) than the risk of multiples.261  But some of the potential problems 
would apply to the risk of multiple births as well.  In particular, the weakness of informed consent 
may lie not in lack of knowledge, but in lack of appreciation of the risks and psychological 
barriers to that appreciation.262  Some evidence suggests that fertility patients are very well-versed 
in the risks of higher order multiples and, to a somewhat lesser degree, of twins.263  But cognitive 
dissonance may lead some to discount known risks, as they do not fit with their pre-existing view 
of multiples, particularly twins.  Patients may have trouble making sense of the statistical data and 
dealing with the complexities of the decision as well.264 
While these factors may make achieving effective informed consent more difficult, they 
do not justify depriving women of the right to make choices regarding their infertility treatment, 
including the number of embryos to transfer.265  Recognizing these potential barriers to 
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understanding, though, can help physicians present the information in ways that patients can 
comprehend and absorb.  Research into how to accomplish this goal is ongoing and showing 
promise.  One recent study suggests that decisional aids, such as brochures and DVDs, can be 
effective in translating increased knowledge into changed preferences for transfer of fewer 
embryos.  The study found that the desirability of twins decreased in both the group receiving the 
brochure and the group viewing the DVD, but the DVD group reported a significantly greater 
preference for single embryo transfer than the brochure group.  The researchers postulate that part 
of the enhanced impact of the DVD stemmed from the emotional impact of hearing from mothers 
of twins.  Using such a DVD could provide a cost-effective means of educating patients and 
changing attitudes.  In addition, room still exists for improvements in physician education.  Some 
physicians lack sufficient knowledge of certain risks associated with multiples.266  Improving 
knowledge and changing attitudes among physicians can facilitate changes in patient 
understanding and preferences.267  So too might providing more comprehensive counseling about 
psychosocial as well as medical risks of multiples.268 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Outliers like Nadya Suleman and Dr. Kamrava will always exist, even in a regime of 
legislative prohibition.  Neither public condemnation of Suleman, influenced by societal norms 
about motherhood, nor the anti-abortion movement, should drive legislative policy.  While the 
goal of avoiding multiple births for the sake of women and their future children is one we should 
embrace, we should not do so at the cost of women’s reproductive freedom and autonomy.  
Legislative embryo transfer restrictions would infringe women’s constitutional right to procreate, 
undercut women’s familial authority, perpetuate harmful and degrading stereotypes of infertile 
women as “irrational” and render women adversaries against their future children and physicians.  
No compelling reasons exist to subject infertile women and their physicians to such pernicious 
and heavy-handed regulation at this time.  Rather, we should focus on enhancing physician self-
regulation, patient education, and informed consent.  These efforts can lead to reductions in 
multiple births while preserving and promoting women’s right to reproductive and medical 
autonomy. 
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